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NONLAWYERS INFLUENCING LAWYERS:  
TOO MANY COOKS IN THE KITCHEN 
OR STONE SOUP? 
Michele DeStefano*
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Bring what you’ve got.  Put it in the pot.”1
Most of us have heard the folk story of Stone Soup, wherein two hungry 
travelers convince a town that they can make soup from a stone.  Although 
there are many different versions of the story—some of which depict the 
travelers as con artists—in every version, the message is that it is not the 
stone that makes the soup rich and flavorful, but instead, the individual 
ingredients that each of the townspeople is able to provide.  The story not 
only transcends time, culture, and generation, but also applies to all kinds of 
disciplines, perspectives, and areas of expertise.
 
2
Just like really good soup, really good ideas often result from open and 
diverse environments in which people from different disciplines, with 
varying expertise and perspectives, “bring what [they]’ve got and put it in 
the pot.”
 
3  There are many examples that support this premise.4
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law (formerly known as 
Michele DeStefano Beardslee).  The author would like to thank Michael Bossone, Mary I. 
Coombs, Renee Newman Knake, Bruce Green, Laurel Terry, Andrew M. Pearlman, Robert 
E. Rosen, Maya Steinitz, and W. Bradley Wendel for advice and feedback on drafts.  She 
thanks Jon Callaghan for recommending Steven Johnson’s book, Where Good Ideas Come 
From:  The Natural History of Innovation, and for continually opening her mind to other 
disciplines and approaches.  She also thanks Rico Williams for his research assistance.  
Lastly, it should be noted that given her interest in and views about claim funding, the author 
has recently been asked to provide consultancy services to one of the major U.S. players in 
this space.  However, the opinions and viewpoints in this Article are very much the author’s 
own, and are ones that she has held for some time. 
  Pulitzer 
 1. HEATHER FOREST, STONE SOUP 28 (Susan Gaber illus., 1998). 
 2. There are many different versions of the fable. See, e.g., Folk & Fairytale 
Variations, Part 2:  Stone Soup, MGPL WEBRARY, http://www.webrary.org/kids/
jbibfairytalevariations2.html#STONE%20SOUP (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (listing several 
versions); Stone Soup:  Folktales of Aarne-Thompson-Uther Type 1548, U. PITT. (D.L. 
Ashliman ed. trans., Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type1548.html (translating 
variations on the tale).  Although some versions of this story depict the travelers as tricksters 
taking advantage of villagers, this Article bases its analogy and references to Stone Soup on 
Heather Forest’s children’s book, which depicts the travelers as catalysts to collaboration 
among villagers. See generally FOREST, supra note 1. 
 3. FOREST, supra note 1. 
 4. See Felix Maringe et al., Leadership, Diversity and Decision Making, CTR. FOR 
EXCELLENCE IN LEADERSHIP 13 (Mar. 2007), http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/files/r9.pdf (“The 
increasingly diverse nature of work place groups and teams has been documented since the 
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and Nobel Prizes have been awarded to teams, as opposed to single 
individuals.5  Whatever the explanation for this team success—whether 
people are collaborating more frequently now than before, whether the 
scientific community had not previously recognized that inventions are a 
team effort, or whether the problems have become more complicated6—
scientific research today is often conducted, and reports often written, by 
multiple scientists and specialists.7  Some of the most cutting-edge fields in 
science are interdisciplinary, such as cognitive neuroscience, biotechnology, 
and biopharmaceuticals.8  Similarly, researchers have concluded that 
diversity of opinion, experience, and discipline can add value.  Studies have 
shown time and time again that diverse teams make better decisions about 
complex problems.9
 
late 1980’s at least.  Since then, numerous writers have suggested that diverse teams may be 
advantageous to organisations, especially in performing decision making tasks.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Group of Diverse Problem Solvers Can 
Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PNAS 16,385, 16,385 (2004) (“In 
the past, much of the public interest in diversity has focused on issues of fairness and 
representation.  More recently, however, there has been a rising interest in the benefits of 
diversity.”). 
 
 5. See Sensory Scientists and Marketing Researchers, Their Role in the Product 
Innovation Process, INSIGHTS NOW! (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.insightsnow.com/expertise/
sensory-scientists-and-marketing-researchers-their-role-in-the-product-innovation-process 
(“[T]wo-time Pulitzer Prize winner Walter Lippman emphasizes the power of critical 
thinking through collaboration.”); see also Jonah Lehrer, Groupthink:  The Brainstorming 
Myth, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 22, 23 (citing Ben Jones’s study of peer-reviewed 
papers and patents over the past fifty years that shows that teaming has increased in over 95 
percent of scientific fields). But see SEALE HARRIS, BANTING’S MIRACLE:  THE STORY OF THE 
DISCOVERER OF INSULIN 98–103, 126–27 (1946) (discussing how 1923 Nobel Prize co-
winners Frederick Banting and J.J.R. Macleod disputed who deserved the credit for 
discovering insulin). 
 6. See Lehrer, supra note 5 (citing Ben Jones’s study explaining that the increase in 
collaboration is because “all the remaining problems are incredibly hard”). 
 7. Frontier Fables, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 97 (reviewing FUTURE SCIENCE:  
ESSAYS FROM THE CUTTING EDGE (Max Brockman ed., 2011)) (“Modern scientific papers 
can have dozens of specialised authors.”); Susan Cain, Op-Ed., The Rise of the New 
Groupthink, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at SR1 (“[R]ecent studies suggest that influential 
academic work is increasingly conducted by teams rather than by individuals.”); Lehrer, 
supra note 5, at 23 (“Today, regardless of whether researchers are studying particle physics 
or human genetics, science papers by multiple authors receive more than twice as many 
citations as those by individuals.”); see also Lawrence H. Summers, The 21st Century 
Education, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at ED26 (“[T]he fraction of economics papers that are 
co-authored has more than doubled in the 30 years that I have been an economist.”). 
 8. Consider the success of the Broad Institute, a cooperative effort between Harvard 
and MIT that funds experimental, fully collaborative research between scientists in different 
fields to come up with innovative solutions to problems in biology, genetics, and genomics. 
See Gina Kolata, Power in Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, at D1 (attributing the success 
of Dr. Eric Lander and the Broad Institute to multidisciplinary collaboration and Dr. Eric 
Lander’s multifaceted expertise in math, molecular biology, medicine, and genomics).  Even 
the structure and form of MIT’s Building 20 force scientists and researchers to comingle. 
Lehrer, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.  Diversity has many different definitions.  In this Article, unless 
otherwise specified, “diversity” applies to both observable categories of human 
heterogeneity, including race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, age, physical appearance, 
social class, economic status, and disability, and nonobservable categories, including 
leadership and communication style, lifestyle, experience, expertise, beliefs, organizational 
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Although the attention may be new, the premise is not.  Indeed, trans-
disciplinary interaction is credited for the prolific creative era of the 
1920s—when writers, poets, artists, and architects all met in cafes to 
connect, debate, and share ideas10—which gave us some of the most 
transcendent, timeless, art and literature in history.11  Importantly, and 
perhaps counterintuitively, the power of diverse networks is not contingent 
on the strength of the ties; even weak ties or alliances with other disciplines 
add value.12  Outside influence, no matter how limited, enhances innovation 
and problem solving.13
Yet, the rules regulating the U.S. legal profession foster a closed 
environment, one that discourages nonlawyer influence on lawyers and 
alliances between legal and non-legal professionals.  In light of our growing 
understanding of other fields, it may be time to reexamine some of these 
rules and their underlying assumptions.  The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the bar licensing requirements, the application of the work-
product doctrine and attorney-client privilege, and even the way law firms 
structure themselves consistently impede an open multi-disciplinary 
approach.  Instead, they favor a closed environment and/or an exclusive 
one-on-one relationship between attorneys and their clients.
 
14  In some way 
or another, they support the notion that when lawyers work with 
nonlawyers, there are too many cooks in the kitchen.15
 
affiliation, religion, and level of education. See Hong & Page, supra note 
  
4, at 16,385 (“In 
the common understanding, diversity in a group of people refers to differences in their 
demographic characteristics, cultural identities and ethnicity, and training and expertise.”); 
Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads:  Understanding the 
Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402, 405 
(1996) (emphasizing observable categories); Tony Simons & Lisa Hope Pelled, 
Understanding Executive Diversity:  More than Meets the Eye, 22 HUM. RESOURCE PLAN., 
no. 2, 1999, at 49, 49–50 (emphasizing non-observable categories). 
 10.  STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM:  THE NATURAL HISTORY OF 
INNOVATION 163 (2010). 
 11. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. See infra Part I.D. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15.  Legal education is also not collaborative.  For many law students, law school 
involves attending traditional mono-discipline classes taught by one professor utilizing a 
Socratic or soft-Socratic method, with around 80–100 other students who are not nearly as 
diverse as the U.S. population generally.  Students are rarely assigned team projects.  
Although students do join study groups, research on these groups indicates that students are 
not inclined to seek their peers’ opinions or engage in group work. See Dorothy H. Evensen, 
To Group or Not to Group:  Students’ Perceptions of Collaborative Learning Activities in 
Law School, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343, 366 (2004).  Despite believing that “multiple 
perspectives” is an important factor in succeeding in law school, see id. at 404–05, students 
“persistently h[o]ld to notions of learning as an individual, idiosyncratic enterprise and 
appear[] disdainful or dismissive of pedagogical attempts to encourage group activity,” id. at 
385. 
  On the one hand, this is not surprising given the rules regulating lawyers.  On the 
other hand, it is.  First, some of the biggest breakthroughs in how we think about the law in 
the past thirty years come from the “law and” movement—e.g., law and economics, law and 
society, etc. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi, Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Legal Education, 
6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 353 (2009).  Second, law schools now seek to hire professors 
who, in addition to having J.D.s, also have degrees in another discipline. See Neil H. 
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This notion, and the rules and regulations supporting it, is driven in part 
by a belief in the benefits of a unique and confidential relationship between 
lawyer and client—possibly one of the most valuable things lawyers offer 
to clients.16  It is also undeniably motivated by a legitimate desire to protect 
clients, the public, and the professionalism and integrity of the legal 
profession by ensuring lawyers’ independent judgment.17  However, as 
Bruce Green pointed out over ten years ago, “The premise of these rules is 
essentially that, when lawyers practice law, they must avoid the corrupting 
influence of nonlawyers (other than, of course, their own clients); clients 
are best served by lawyers who preserve their ‘professional independence’ 
by avoiding unholy alliances with the laity.”18  Further, as Green and others 
also claim, these protectionist notions are likely also driven by a desire to 
ensure that the legal profession maintains its monopoly over the legal 
marketplace.19
 
Buchanan, Why Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship Is Good for the Law, the Academy, and 
Society at Large, VERDICT (Jan. 19, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/01/19/why-
interdisciplinary-legal-scholarship-is-good-for-the-law-the-academy-and-society-at-large.  
Given that law schools have begun to rethink the value of interdisciplinary scholarship, 
perhaps change is on the horizon for legal education. See, e.g., Parisi, supra, at 348.  Indeed, 
legal education programs have developed over the past ten years that focus on learning team 
skills and that are designed to break down the barriers between law and other disciplines. 
See, e.g., B614 The Legal Profession, IND. U. MAURER SCH. L., 
http://apps.law.indiana.edu/degrees/courses/lookup.asp?course=30 (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012); LAWWITHOUTWALLS, http://lawwithoutwalls.org (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); 
Leipzig-Miami Seminar, U. MIAMI SCH. L., http://www.law.miami.edu/about_us/
leipzig_seminar.php?op=6 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Ph.D Program (JSP), BERKELEY L., 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/160.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); Problem Solving 
Workshop 5, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/
index.html?o=14956 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 
 16. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 135 
(2011); see also MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333–34 (Va. 1998) (basing 
its decision that legal malpractice claims were not assignable on the special relationship 
between the attorney and client); Sebok, supra, at 67 & n.24 (similar). 
 17. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:  
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1128–32 (2000) (exploring the justifications for New York’s ethical 
ban on advertising and statutory ban on corporations practicing law, and explaining that 
“[t]here was more than a hint about the need to preserve the practice of law as a 
profession”); id. at 1139–40 (recalling the opinion of one committee member that “‘there is 
nothing inherently “unethical” in the formation of partnerships between lawyers largely 
engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert’” but that rules banning it were necessary 
“‘[a]s a matter of professional policy’” (alteration in original) (quoting Proposed 
Supplements to Canon of Professional Ethics, 13 A.B.A. J. 268, 273 (1927))); see also 
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW:  BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (rev. ed. 1924); Russell G. 
Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift:  Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will 
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1259 (1995) 
(identifying business professionalism regulations, adopted by the ABA and Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility Committee, intended “to protect clients and to encourage 
lawyers to perform [these practices] in a ‘professional’ manner”). 
 18. Green, supra note 17, at 1117. 
 19. See infra Part II.A; see also Green, supra note 17, at 1118 (contending that the 
“actual motivation” of the existing rules is to “thwart competition” and demonstrating this is 
so by tracing the history behind the rules); id. at 1131–33 (explaining that the primary 
motivating factor was to keep a monopoly and increase profits, but the “justification” was to 
protect clients from lawyers that would be corrupted by lay people’s influence); id. at 1135 
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Ironically, these strategic protectionist maneuvers may be misguided and 
counterproductive.  First, they do not represent the way many U.S. lawyers 
actually practice.  Second, in an economic downturn, where the line 
between what is business and what is law is anything but clear, such tactics 
may limit lawyers’ range of business opportunities.  Instead of protecting 
lawyers’ economic futures, it may provide the impetus for nonlawyers, who 
want a piece of the lawyers’ pie, to innovate.20  Indeed, we have already 
seen this taking place with legal process outsourcing, where nonlawyers 
(and ex-lawyers) form multidisciplinary teams to provide quasi-legal or 
extra-legal services inside and outside the United States, in an effort to 
achieve better, more efficient results.21
The broad thesis of this Article is that an environment that fosters input 
from nonlawyers is better than a closed one, and that the time has come to 
rethink the U.S. legal profession’s rules and structures that were designed to 
narrow exposure to, and influence by, nonlawyers.  To illustrate this 
contention, this Article highlights one recent movement in the globalized 
legal marketplace that remains stymied in the United States:  nonlawyer 
  Third, in a globalized legal market, 
other countries like the United Kingdom and Australia have embraced 
nonlawyer influence and alliances with lawyers through outside investment 
in law firms and claims.  As lawyers from these countries compete with 
those in the United States, it is possible that U.S. lawyers soon will be—or 
perhaps already are—left behind by those who are answering the needs of 
large corporate clients by providing trans-disciplinary “soup.” 
 
(explaining that bar leaders admitted that their motivation in preventing corporations from 
practicing law was “primarily to protect lawyers’ livelihood”); id. at 1145 (“[T]he core 
values rationale is a belated explanation for restrictions that, at their inception, were 
transparently motivated by the financial self-interest of the bar’s leadership.”); infra note 119 
(identifying authors who criticize unauthorized-practice-of-law rules as protecting the legal 
monopoly).  Some might argue it is driven by a desire to cabin off the legal marketplace 
from capital markets or to resist the idea that the there is a legal market.  Proving the reasons 
behind the rules is outside the scope of this Article, but understanding their motivation is 
worthy of more discussion. 
 20. It is not that the rules, in and of themselves, make this more likely, but that they 
impede structures utilizing teams of lawyers and nonlawyers that could best perform the 
work. 
 21. Legal process outsourcing companies perform not only the repetitive administrative 
functions associated with legal work and paralegal work, but also the complex work 
involved in legal research, due diligence, contract negotiations, etc. See, e.g., Milton C. 
Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries:  The 
Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2139–40 (2010); Jayanth K. 
Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2189, 2201–04 (2007); Laura MacIntyre, Outsourcing Out in the Open, HC ONLINE (Apr. 8, 
2009), http://www.hcamag.com/resources/Outsourcing/outsourcing-out-in-the-open/115396.  
These outsourcing companies were originally offshore in places like India, where costs 
savings could be realized.  However, legal outsourcing firms are emerging in various parts of 
the United States as well. See Steve Mark, Tahlia Gordon, Marlene Le Brun, & Gary 
Tamsitt, Preserving the Ethics and Integrity of the Legal Profession in an Evolving Market:  
A Comparative Regulatory Response 11 (June 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/UK_paper.doc/$file/UK_
paper.doc. See generally Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat:  Globalization and Its 
Effect on Lawyers Practicing in Non-global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527 
(2008) (demonstrating that globalization is relevant to all lawyers). 
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investment in claims i.e., claim funding.22  The current rules and 
regulations governing nonlawyer investment in claims epitomize the U.S. 
legal profession’s stance on collaboration between lawyers and 
nonlawyers.23  Many states completely outlaw claim funding by nonlawyers 
based on outdated and arguably inaccurate interpretations of the ancient 
doctrines of maintenance, interfering in a legal proceeding by a third party 
that is not a party to the suit; champerty, maintenance for a profit; and 
barratry, inciting litigation.24  Although some states have abolished these 
antiquated barriers to claim funding, many states make approval contingent 
on the third-party funder having absolutely no control, input, or influence 
over litigation decisions and case management—a rule that, as a practical 
matter, is unrealistic.25
 
 22. The nomenclature to describe this kind of third-party capital investment in 
arbitration or litigation claims is all over the map and woefully undescriptive.  It has been 
referred to as “third-party funding,” “third-party litigation funding or financing,” or most 
commonly “alternative litigation funding or financing.” See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 
20/20, White Paper on Alternative Litigation Finance 1 & nn.1–4 (draft Oct. 19, 2011) 
[hereinafter ABA White Paper], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf 
(listing articles using various terms).  The term “third-party” is insufficiently descriptive 
because, as the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) has pointed out, third parties 
provide many types of litigation funding, some of which have been around for years:  
nonrecourse loans to both law firms and clients, insurer-insured agreements, transfer of 
claims in bankruptcy proceedings, transfers of patent claims, and contingency fees. See 
Letter from John H. Beisner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, to ABA Comm’n 
on Ethics 20/20, at 2 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Beisner Letter], in ABA Comm’n on Ethics 
20/20, Comments:  Alternative Litigation Financing Working Group Issues Paper 136 
(2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
ethics_2020/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_issues_paper.pdf; see also id. at 
1 (“ILR is a not-for-profit advocacy organization affiliated with the United States Chamber 
of Commerce . . . .”).  “Alternative” is more apt, but, as discussed later, it is not clear that 
this funding method differs from methods that have been available for decades. See infra 
Part IV.A.  Further, the term “litigation” is underinclusive, as this kind of activity funds 
many kinds of claims at various stages, including arbitration and collection of judgment.  
Finally, the term “financing” may suggest many different types of transactions, including 
loans repayable with interest at a fixed rate, whereas the actual practice is more like a 
contingency fee, in which capital is exchanged for the promise to repay the principal plus a 
percentage of the profit only if the claimholder prevails.  “Funding” is a more accurate term 
since it suggests ownership and control over the decisions to fund.  Thus, this Article uses 
the terms “claim funding” or “outside investment in claims.” 
 
 23. Arguably, the same can be said about the ABA’s current stance on nonlawyer 
investment in law firms and multidisciplinary partnerships, both of which are barred by 
Model Rule 5.4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2009). 
 24. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (“[M]aintenance is helping another 
prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the 
outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty.”); see infra 
notes 187–89 and accompanying text. 
 25. Vicki Waye, Conflicts of Interests Between Claimholders, Lawyers and Litigation 
Entrepreneurs, 19 BOND L. REV. 225, 237 n.56 (2007) (Austl.) (“Even though most litigation 
funders do not appoint the client’s legal advisers and representatives, they are likely to be 
influential in the client’s decision making.  Some funders work with preferred firms partly to 
minimise conflicts and disputes over claim management.”). 
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This Article starts with the premise that law is a business, and thus the 
legal market cannot be insulated from capital markets.26  Because what 
happens in other parts of the world invariably affects what happens in the 
United States,27
Part I of this Article describes the benefits that come from open 
environments.  It reviews literature from other fields that show that open 
and diverse environments yield more innovation and better problem solving 
and decision making.  Part II reviews the many rules, doctrines, and 
structures affecting the U.S. legal profession that encourage or require 
lawyers and clients to work in closed environments.  By utilizing claim 
funding as an example, Part III shows how the legal marketplace in other 
countries has opened itself up to outside influence more than has the 
marketplace in the United States.  Part IV assesses the risks and benefits of 
influence by nonlawyers in the commercial claim funding context.  It argues 
that, with the right level of regulation, and when the agreement is between 
the corporate claimholder and the funder, the inherent benefits outweigh the 
risks.  Further, it contends that embracing commercial claim funding may 
lead to innovation, better case management, and enhanced problem solving, 
and that rejecting such investment may be a recipe for trouble.  Ultimately, 
this Article concludes that the legal profession’s continued attachment to 
rules and structures that compel closed environments and severely restrict 
the influence of nonlawyers on lawyers (at least in the commercial context) 
may leave the U.S. legal profession woefully behind other countries, and 
U.S. lawyers with a smaller piece of the pie. 
 there will be strong pressure for the United States to allow 
investment in claims in all fifty states, and to a greater degree than currently 
allowed.  Although the bar may be able to resist buy-in for some 
unpredictable but possibly significant period of time, this Article contends 
that lawyers and clients will potentially benefit if the U.S. bar embraces 
claim funding in the commercial context and implements a regulatory 
system to maximize its advantages and minimize its potential risks.  
Further, this Article utilizes the example of claim funding to show that 
granting nonlawyers more influence could stimulate much needed 
innovation in the provision and management of legal services, enhance 
problem solving and efficiency for the benefit of clients and society, and 
increase lawyer’s ability to compete in a global marketplace.    Instead of 
equating outside influence by nonlawyers with having “too many cooks in 
the kitchen,” the U.S. legal profession could take advantage of a regulated 
level of influence to help create the richest stone soup possible. 
 
 26. This is evidenced by the number of companies that have begun to take advantage of 
the increasingly fragmented legal market to offer what used to be deemed legal services, 
such as LegalZoom, see LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Apr. 21, 
2012), and the acceptance of outside investment in law firms and claims outside the United 
States, see infra Part III.  Furthermore, claiming that law is an industry (with over $1 billion 
in gross revenues) and that it has a market (or multiple markets) is not novel. See generally 
ERIN O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009). 
 27. See Laurel S. Terry, A “How To” Guide for Incorporating Global and Comparative 
Perspectives into the Required Professional Responsibility Course, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1135, 1136–38 (2007). 
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I.  THE BENEFIT OF OPEN ENVIRONMENTS 
“A world where a diverse mix of distinct professions and passions overlap 
is a world where exaptations thrive.”28
Recent scientific inquiry into the creative process has revealed that most 
inventions are neither spontaneous nor created from scratch, but are rather 
pre-existing ideas applied in new contexts.  They primarily result from 
fostering diverse connections among a broad spectrum of people and 
professions.  In light of this kind of research, many corporations, and even 
some overseas law firms, have taken steps to create open environments.  So 
far, the U.S. legal profession, at least with respect to its rules and structures 
generally has not.  This part summarizes some of the benefits that U.S. 
lawyers may be sacrificing in favor of excluding nonlawyer influence. 
 
A.  Third Places and Exaptations 
A “third place,” according to the sociologist and anthropologist Ray 
Oldenburg, is an environment that enables connections among people from 
different disciplines and is set apart from traditional meeting places like the 
home or office.29  Third places flourish because they create open and 
eclectic environments where people can share the camaraderie of those with 
a zest for life and engagement, albeit in different disciplines.30  Sigmund 
Freud created a third place in Vienna for physicians, philosophers, and 
scientists to share thoughts on psychoanalysis.31  Similarly, in the 1920s, 
writers, poets, artists, and architects met in cafés to connect, debate, and 
share ideas.  According to scholars, it was “rubbing shoulders” with these 
different types of people that created the “cultural innovation” for which the 
1920s are known.32  Today, that third place might be virtual.33
 
 28. JOHNSON, supra note 
  So long as 
the space or place promotes creative interaction among people from 
10, at 162; see infra notes 39–44 and accompanying text 
(explaining exaptation). 
 29. RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE:  CAFÉS, COFFEE SHOPS, COMMUNITY 
CENTERS, BEAUTY PARLORS, GENERAL STORES, BARS, HANGOUTS AND HOW THEY GET YOU 
THROUGH THE DAY 20–22 (1989).  According to Oldenburg, their virtue is not that they are a 
“haven of escape from home and work.” Id. at 21.  Rather, their virtue rests on the following:  
first, they are on “neutral ground,” id. at 22–23; second, they are inclusive despite 
differences in background or status and therefore “a leveler,” id. at 23–26; third, the main 
activity is “lively flow[ing]” conversation, id. at 26–31; fourth, they are places that are very 
accessible in terms of location and will accommodate individuals or groups during any hour 
of the day, id. at 32–33; fifth, they are filled with “regulars whose mood and manner provide 
the infectious and contagious style of interaction and whose acceptance of new faces is 
crucial,” id. at 33–36; and sixth, they are places that have a certain “low profile,” “playful” 
feeling, “a home away from home,” id. at 36–41. 
 30. See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 162–63; OLDENBURG, supra note 29, at 42.  For a 
modern example of a third place, see TECH BREWERY, http://www.techbrewery.org (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 31. See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 162–63. 
 32. Id. at 163. 
 33. An example of a virtual third place could be LawWithoutWalls (a venture founded 
by the author and co-created with Michael Bossone), where professionals and students from 
different disciplines collaborate and share information and expertise to create “Projects of 
Worth.” See LAWWITHOUTWALLS, supra note 15. 
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different disciplines, backgrounds, and political views, with various types 
and levels of expertise and passions, there will be “value . . . in the unlikely 
migrations that happen between the different clusters.”34
These “unlikely migrations” spawn innovation.  According to Steven 
Johnson, “Concepts from one domain migrate to another as a kind of 
structuring metaphor, thereby unlocking some secret door that had long 
been hidden from view.”
 
35  The common conception is that inventions are 
discovered by a scientist, alone in a lab, coming upon the “a-ha” or 
“eureka” moment, but that is often not the case.36  Instead, it is the 
interactions that scientists have with others that lead to breakthroughs.37  As 
one scientist explains, “‘the results of one person’s reasoning bec[o]me the 
input to another person’s reasoning . . . resulting in significant changes in 
all aspects of the way the research [is] conducted.’”38
Exaptation (as opposed to adaptation) occurs when something is 
borrowed from one field and used to solve a problem in a totally unrelated 
field.
  The changes also 
ultimately alter the end result.  In other words, it is the meeting of the minds 
that enables the migration.  And that migration, or exaptation, is the pearl of 
the oyster. 
39
 
 34. JOHNSON, supra note 
  A famous exaptation is Johannes Gutenberg’s printing press.  Each 
10, at 162–63; OLDENBURG, supra note 29, at 290 (“The 
individual is warmed and enriched by the breadth of these relationships.  The fragmented 
world becomes more whole and the broader contact with life, thus gained, adds to one’s 
wisdom and self-assurance. . . .  Individuals benefit despite themselves.”); id. at 291 
(“Consensus, if we are to call it that, follows interaction and involvement more often than it 
precedes it.  Individuals, like neighborhoods, evolve and develop.  When people are thrown 
together, they discover much to like, to get attached to, to add to their lives, and to change 
their minds about.”). 
 35. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 159 (citing ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 
(1964)). 
 36. See id. at 60–61. 
 37. See id. at 61; see also id. ch. 3 (describing examples of “slow hunch” innovation); 
Jonah Lehrer, How to Be Creative, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10–11, 2012, at C1 (“We tend to 
assume that experts are the creative geniuses in their own fields.  But big breakthroughs 
often depend on the naive daring of outsiders.  For prompting creativity, few things are as 
important as time devoted to cross-pollination with fields outside our areas of expertise.”). 
 38. See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 61 (quoting psychologist Kevin Dunbar’s research); 
see also Sarah Greene, Editorial, Innovations ‘R Us:  Networks Move Scientific Discovery 
Forward at the Speed of Light, SCIENTIST, Dec. 2010, at 13 (discussing Kevin Dunbar’s 
research into how scientists formulate important ideas and concluding that the “wide 
majority of breakthrough concepts originated not in solitary moments at the lab bench, but 
rather at weekly lab meetings when scientists shared data, findings, errors, and conflicting 
results”); supra note 8 and accompanying text; infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 39. The term “exaptation” was originally coined by evolutionary biologists Stephen Jay 
Gould and Elizabeth S. Vrba to describe a change in the biology of a species that was 
different than adaptation. See Stephen Jay Gould & Elizabeth S. Vrba, Exaptation—A 
Missing Term in the Science of Form, 8 PALEOBIOLOGY 4–15 (1982).  The term “adaptation” 
is restricted “only to those structures that evolved for their current utility,” whereas 
“exaptation” is for “those useful structures that arose for other reasons or for no conventional 
reasons at all, and were then fortuitously available for other usages.” STEPHEN JAY GOULD, 
HEN’S TEETH AND HORSE’S TOES 171 (1983); see Nicholas Dew et al., The Economic 
Implications of Exaptation 3 (Darden Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 02-
08, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=348060 (defining exaptation as “a feature 
co-opted for its present role from some other origin”); Roger Lass, How to Do Things with 
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of the key pieces of the printing press had been developed long before 
Gutenberg put them together, but no one had been able to create a movable 
type system.  Gutenberg’s genius was in borrowing the pieces—some from 
the mechanics of a screw press used to make wine—and putting them 
together in a new way.40  According to Arthur Koestler, “All decisive 
advances in the history of scientific thought can be described in terms of 
mental cross-fertilization between different disciplines.”41  Indeed, the idea 
that cross-fertilization—as opposed to self-fertilization—is the key to 
success was one of Charles Darwin’s main points in his writings.42  As 
shown in his research on orchids, evolution can occur from very limited raw 
material.43  In other words, innovation often comes from “refurbished” 
parts as opposed to newfangled creation.44
The same principle applies to business.  In his study of business school 
graduates who had become entrepreneurs, Stanford Business School 
 
 
Junk:  Exaptation in Language Evolution, 26 J. LINGUISTICS 79, 80 (1990).  Gould and Vrba 
suggested that the term “exaptation” included those characteristics that “evolved for other 
usages (or for no function at all), and later [were] ‘coopted’ for their current role.” Gould & 
Vrba, supra, at 6.  In other words, as Johnson explains, exaptation is when “[a]n organism 
develops a trait optimized for a specific use, but then the trait gets hijacked for a completely 
different function.” JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 153–54. 
  An archetypal example of an exaptation is bird feathers. Id. at 154.  Originally, 
feathers were on creatures to keep them warm, not to help them fly—and indeed, these 
creatures did not fly.  However, as these creatures began trying to fly, these feathers ended 
up being accidentally useful to help the creatures glide. Id. at 154 (describing “[t]he initial 
transformation [as] almost accidental”).  Over time, as “that new property gets put to use, . . . 
the trait evolves according to a different set of criteria” and “mutations” that enable better 
gliding (as opposed to just warmth) now begin to repeat themselves due to natural selection. 
Id. at 154.  “A feather adapted for warmth is now exapted for flight.” Id. at 155. 
  Exaptation has also been used to described technical innovations.  For example, the 
compact disc has been identified as “a classic example . . . that illustrates both the processes 
of adaptation and exaptation.” Dew et al., supra, at 8 (explaining how the CD-ROM was 
patented “as a digital-to-optical recording and playback system,” but researchers used it as “a 
data storage medium for computers” to record their data, “a function [it] was not designed 
for”). 
 40. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 152–53 (“[Gutenberg] took a machine designed to get 
people drunk and turned it into an engine for mass communication.”).  Scholars have pointed 
out that essential to exaptation is the combining of a “new domain of use.” Dew et al., supra 
note 39, at 9 (explaining that exaptation “thrives on . . . technology-domain combinations, 
not on technology-technology combinations” and “the combination of technology and new 
domain of use is ‘a quintessential entrepreneurial activity’” (citing Daniel A. Levinthal, The 
Slow Pace of Rapid Technological Change:  Gradualism and Punctuation in Technological 
Change, 7 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 217, 220 (1998))).  For more examples of exaptations 
that developed in this way, see JULIE BURSTEIN, SPARK:  HOW CREATIVITY WORKS 30–36 
(2011) (ordinary noise to sound effects for the movies Star Wars and Wall-E); JOHNSON, 
supra note 10, at 158–59 (plaster sculptures to DNA replication, and computer code for 
sharing academic research to the modern, seemingly endless uses of the internet); Dew et al., 
supra note 39, at 12, 16–19 (innovations that saved Apollo 13 crew, tractor design, and 
continuous exaptations in Japanese car industry). 
 41. KOESTLER, supra note 35, at 230; see also JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 159. 
 42. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB:  MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL 
HISTORY 19–20 (1980). 
 43. See id. (citing CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE VARIOUS CONTRIVANCES BY WHICH 
BRITISH AND FOREIGN ORCHIDS ARE FERTILIZED BY INSECTS (1862)). 
 44. Id. at 26. 
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Professor Martin Ruef found that the most innovative and successful 
entrepreneurs were those who had broad and diverse social networks.45  
According to others interpreting his data, these entrepreneurs were 
successful, in part, because they “were able to borrow or co-opt new ideas 
from these external environments and put them to use in a new context.”46  
Studies on collaboration in the workplace arrive at similar conclusions.47  
Thus unsurprisingly, successful and innovative companies are taking a 
“kaizen”-like approach,48 moving away from closed groups toward 
collaborative networks that increase information flow between diverse 
groups inside and outside the company49 to create innovative and profitable 
products.50
 
 45. Martin Ruef, Strong Ties, Weak Ties and Islands:  Structural and Cultural 
Predictors of Organizational Innovation, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 427, 429 (2002) 
(“[T]he propensity of individual entrepreneurs to break with convention is both encouraged 
by social relations—which may bring disparate ideas, routine or technologies to an 
entrepreneur’s attention—and discouraged by social relations—which may introduce 
pressures for conformity or concerns about trust.”); see ROB CROSS & ANDREW PARKER, THE 
HIDDEN POWER OF SOCIAL NETWORKS:  UNDERSTANDING HOW WORK REALLY GETS DONE IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 81–83 (2004) (“Research has shown that people with more diverse, 
entrepreneurial networks tend to be more successful”). 
 
 46. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 166; id. at 166–67 (describing a similar study by a 
professor who studied innovation at Raytheon Corporation and found that “innovative 
thinking was much more likely to emerge from individuals who bridged ‘structural holes’ 
between tightly knit clusters”); Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, 
Combinative Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology, 3 ORG. SCI. 383, 391 (1992) 
(“Creating new knowledge does not occur in abstraction from current abilities.  Rather, new 
learning, such as innovations, are products of a firm’s combinative capabilities to generate 
new applications from existing knowledge.”); see also Dew et al., supra note 39, at 26 
(“[N]ew markets develop as the result of the application of an existing technology to a new 
domain of use . . . .  When an entrepreneur flips a technology into an adjacent possible 
market this is truly an exaptation of the technology, not an adaptation.”). 
 47. See, e.g., CROSS & PARKER, supra note 45, at 120 (“[Companies] report that focusing 
on collaborative opportunities instead of on individual accountability improves problem 
solving, employee morale, and network connectivity.”).  There is also research that suggests 
that the most creative people are often introverts, who may be more creative when they work 
in private without interruption. See, e.g., KEITH SAWYER, GROUP GENIUS:  THE CREATIVE 
POWER OF COLLABORATION 60 (2007); Cain, supra note 7 (“‘[E]vidence from science 
suggests that business people must be insane to use brainstorming groups. . . .  If you have 
talented and motivated people, they should be encouraged to work alone when creativity or 
efficiency is the highest priority.’” (quoting the organizational psychologist Adrian 
Furnham)).  This critique does not hold true when there is diversity of viewpoint and debate, 
however. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Roya Behnia, ‘Legal Kaizens’ and Getting Lawyers to Solve Simple Problems 
Together, LEGAL REBELS (Nov. 2, 2011, 8:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
legalrebels/article/getting_lawyers_to_solve_simple_problems_together/?utm_source=maest
ro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email (explaining that the Japanese word 
“kaizen,” “[r]oughly translated as ‘improvement for the better,’” is a collaboration method 
that “get[s] employees to solve simple problems together”); see also Lehrer, supra note 37 
(“Google hosts an internal conference called Crazy Search Ideas—a sort of grown-up 
science fair with hundreds of posters from every conceivable field.”).  
 49. CROSS & PARKER, supra note 45, at 39. 
 50. See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 170–71 (“Apple’s development cycle looks more 
like a coffeehouse than an assembly line. . . .  Apple calls it concurrent or parallel 
production.  All the groups—design, manufacturing, engineering, sales—meet continuously 
through the product-development cycle, brainstorming, trading ideas and solutions, 
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Exaptation is the door to productivity and new creation, but because 
exaptation is the result of exposure to ideas outside the immediate focus of 
interest, broad diverse connections and networks are the key that opens that 
door. 
B.  Diversity 
Unlikely migrations and exaptations occur because different types of 
people cluster together and converse.  Third places enable improved 
creations because they are open environments that unite people of different 
disciplines and backgrounds.  Similarly, institutions made up of diverse 
types of people gain positive benefits, improve output, and enhance 
problem solving.  While it may be true that diversity can create conflict,51 
impede communication,52 and stymie consensus,53
 
strategizing over the most pressing issues, and generally keeping the conversation open to a 
diverse group of perspectives.”); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, When a Thousand Flowers Bloom:  
Structural, Collective, and Social Conditions for Innovation in Organization, in 10 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 169, 175–77 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings 
eds., 1988) (claiming that diversity in resource input is necessary for innovation); Behnia, 
supra note 
 there is also evidence 
48 (explaining the theory behind “Kaizen” and how both Pfizer and Cisco have 
utilized this approach to create more efficient and creative solutions to problems and to more 
effectively market, and pointing out that Cisco System has created a dialogue not just 
internally and with customers, but with “anyone interested in [the related] issues”).  That 
said, according to exaptation scholars, there is 
some affinity between the concept of exaptation and the concept of externalities, 
which are generally defined as “The effect of one person’s decision on someone 
who is not a party to that decision.”  The difference . . . is that exaptation is a 
phenomenon that is related to context changes that happen over time, and is not 
amenable to analysis at a point in time.  Exaptations are the effect of technologies 
that are later co-opted for their usefulness.  By contrast, externalities are not rooted 
in changes in context. 
Dew et al., supra note 39, at 9 (quoting R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 
(1988)). 
 51. See Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Laurie R. Weingart, Task Versus Relationship 
Conflict, Team Performance, and Team Member Satisfaction:  A Meta-Analysis, 88 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 741, 741, 746–47 (2003); Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizational Demography, in 
5 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 50, at 299, 299–357 (Barry M. Staw 
& L.L. Cummings eds., 1983) (arguing that organizational heterogeneity created conflict that 
was difficult to resolve); Warren E. Watson et al., Cultural Diversity’s Impact on Interaction 
Process and Performance:  Comparing Homogeneous and Diverse Task Groups, 36 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 590, 596–98 (1993) (finding that newly formed culturally diverse groups were less 
process and performance effective than homogeneous groups, i.e., they had “more difficulty 
in agreeing on what was important and in working together, and they more frequently had 
members who tried to be too controlling, which hindered member contributions”). 
 52. See Martha L. Maznevski, Understanding Our Differences:  Performance in 
Decision-Making Groups with Diverse Members, 47 HUM. REL. 531, 536 (1994); W. Gary 
Wagner et al., Organizational Demography and Turnover in Top-Management Groups, 29 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 74, 88–89 (1984) (concluding that heterogeneity can create dysfunction and 
miscommunication that impede progress); Todd R. Zenger & Barbara S. Lawrence, 
Organizational Demography:  The Differential Effects of Age and Tenure Distributions on 
Technical Communication, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 353, 353–76 (1989). 
 53. See Susan E. Jackson, Team Composition in Organizational Settings:  Issues in 
Managing an Increasingly Diverse Work Force, in GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 138, 
150–52, 166–67 (Stephen Worchel et al. eds., 1992); Bruce E. McCain et al., The Effects of 
Departmental Demography on Turnover:  The Case of a University, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 626, 
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that diverse teams generate “greater innovation, increased productivity, and 
a competitive advantage in global competition.”54
We constantly read articles or hear people claim that there is a power of 
diversity in decision making.  For example, senior in-house attorneys insist 
on diverse teams from their outsourcers.
 
55  Senior managers also insist on 
diverse teams internally.56  This is because, as a senior legal counselor of a 
large, publicly traded corporation contended, “combining a broad range of 
backgrounds and experiences—in our outside counsel, in our in-house legal 
team and in our greater work force—leads to the development of creative 
strategies and sophisticated ideas.”57
Moreover, empirical research has shown that diversity’s negative 
repercussions are surmountable.
   
58
 
628–29 (1983); see also Maringe et al., supra note 
  Specifically, diversity has a positive 
4, at 32 (“However, diverse decision 
making groups have also been associated with negative outcomes such as increased conflict, 
inadequate communication and increased marginalization of minority groups.”). 
 54. Susan E. Jackson et al., Understanding the Dynamics of Diversity in Decision-
Making Teams, in RICHARD A. GUZZO, EDUARDO SALAS, & ASSOCS., TEAM EFFECTIVENESS 
AND DECISION MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 204, 214 (1995); Ruef, supra note 45, at 433 
(hypothesizing that “[a]ctors embedded in a diverse set of network ties are more likely to be 
innovative than actors relying on homogenous ties”). 
 55. In October 2004, Sara Lee’s general counsel Rick Palmore issued a “call to action” 
to advance diversity in corporate legal departments and law firms. See Rick Palmore, A Call 
to Action:  Diversity in the Legal Profession, ASS’N CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Article/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=16074; 
see also Melanie Lasoff Levs, Call to Action:  Sara Lee’s General Counsel:  Making 
Diversity a Priority, DIVERSITY & B. (Jan.–Feb. 2005), http://www.mcca.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=803.  By December 2004, over seventy companies’ 
general counsels had signed it, and both the Association of Corporate Counsel and the 
Minority Corporate Counsel Association formally endorsed it and developed a supporting 
website. Id.; see CLOCALLTOACTION WEB DIRECTORY, http://www.clocalltoaction.com (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also Kellie Schmitt, Corporate Diversity Demands Put Pressure 
on Outside Counsel, RECORDER (Dec. 28, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1167214010196 (archived in LexisNexis “Corporate Counsel” 
database) (describing companies pressuring law firms for greater diversity); Aruna 
Viswanatha, On Diversity, It’s Shape Up, or Ship Out, CORP. COUNSEL (Jan. 9, 2007), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?id=1168263431142 (archived in LexisNexis 
“Corporate Counsel” database) (same).  One of the companies to sign on to this agenda was 
Wal-Mart, and they continue to ask their outsourcers to commit to diversity. See Levs, 
supra; Press Release, Walmart, Wal-Mart Requires Diversity in its Law Firms:  
Commitment to Participation Already Making an Impact (Dec. 9, 2005), 
http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/5519.aspx.  For further discussion on Walmart’s 
requirements for outside counsel, see Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Privatizing 
Professionalism:  Client Control of Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2012). 
 56. See Jackson et al., supra note 54, at 208 (“Organizations are rapidly restructuring to 
take advantage of the potential benefits of diverse decision-making teams . . . .”). 
 57. Flor M. Colon, Better Decision Making Through Diversity, DIVERSITY IS NATURAL 
(Summer 2009), http://www.diversityisnatural.com/colon/ (noting that, at the time, Colon 
was senior managing counsel for Xerox’s Latin American operations). 
 58. See Hong & Page, supra note 4, at 16,389 (“An ideal [problem-solving] group would 
contain high-ability problem solvers who are diverse.”); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial 
Diversity and Group Decision Making:  Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition 
on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 598 (2006) (“In other 
words, to the extent that a group can weather the initial conflict that diversity sometimes 
creates—or even use that conflict to its advantage—diversity often has observable benefits 
for group performance and problem solving.”); see also Shelley Brickson, The Impact of 
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impact on accuracy, flexibility, group creativity, thoughtfulness, and 
information sharing.59  Empirical research on racial diversity evidences that 
group discussion and thinking by college students is more complex among 
diverse groups than among all-white groups.60  Similarly, research on jury 
deliberations has suggested that racially heterogeneous juries exchange a 
broader range of information, process that information more methodically 
and thoroughly, make fewer errors when recalling the evidence, and 
develop more accurate assessments.61  This is not simply a result of the 
contribution of minority members of a group.  Instead, research supports the 
conclusion that racial diversity in and of itself changes the way the majority 
members think, communicate, deliberate, and approach collaboration.62
This benefit is not limited to racial diversity.  A study on culturally 
diverse groups found that over time, these groups were better at identifying 
problems and generating alternative solutions.
 
63  Similarly, studies suggest 
that gender and personality diversity can enhance complex problem 
solving.64  This is also the reason, perhaps counterintuitively, why some 
businesspeople claim there is value in hiring lazy employees.  Because lazy 
people bring different values and perspectives, they “find better ways to do 
their jobs, ways to do them more efficiently without sacrificing 
effectiveness.”65
Moreover, it appears that functionally diverse groups
 
66
 
Identity Orientation on Individual and Organizational Outcomes in Demographically 
Diverse Settings, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 82, 82–101 (2000) (claiming that the benefits of 
diversity outweigh the negatives). 
 outperform 
homogenous groups not only when diverse group members have equal 
 59. See Sommers, supra note 58, at 598; see also Maringe et al., supra note 4, at 32 
(explaining that the advantages of diverse groups “include an increase in the quality of group 
performance through creativity of ideas, cooperation, and the number of perspectives and 
alternatives considered”); id. at 13 (“Since then, numerous writers have suggested that 
diverse teams may be advantageous to organisations, especially in performing decision 
making tasks.”). 
 60. See Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking 
in College Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 507, 507–09 (2004). 
 61. See Sommers, supra note 58, at 606–07 (finding that whites “made fewer inaccurate 
statements when in diverse versus all-White groups, despite the fact that they actually 
contributed more information when deliberating in a diverse setting” and explaining that 
“[s]uch a conclusion is consistent with previous findings that motivations to avoid prejudice 
lead Whites to a more systematic and thorough processing of information conveyed by or 
about Black individuals”); id. at 606 (“[T]he presence of Black group members translated 
into fewer guilty votes before deliberations.”).  Sommers conducted a simulated trial to 
determine the benefits that racial heterogeneity can have on group decision making. See id. 
at 601–03. 
 62. See id. at 606–09. 
 63. See Watson et al., supra note 51, at 599. But see supra notes 51–53 and 
accompanying text. 
 64. See MARVIN E. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP 
BEHAVIOR 394–96 (3d ed. 1981). 
 65. See, e.g., Doris Tirone, Lazy Government Employees, GOVLOOP (Jan. 14, 2011, 
6:30 AM), http://www.govloop.com/profiles/blogs/lazy-government-employees. 
 66. Functional diversity is based on the person’s perspective (experience and training) 
and heuristic (techniques for learning and problem solving). See Hong & Page, supra note 4, 
at 16,386. 
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abilities to that of the non-diverse group members, but also when the 
members have less ability.67  In other words, as the researchers of one 
particular study concluded, “diversity trumps ability.”68  While this may not 
always be true all the time, some research shows that a person’s added 
value to a team may be more connected to the difference in the way the 
person thinks and approaches the problem, as opposed to the person’s 
actual ability to solve the problem.69  Diversity of opinion spurs innovation:  
“[T]he encouragement of debate—and even criticism if warranted—appears 
to stimulate more creative ideas.  And cultures that permit and even 
encourage such expression of differing viewpoints may stimulate the most 
innovation.”70  That is true even when the critique is wrong.71  Thus, as 
Johnson points out, “It’s not that the network itself is smart; it’s that the 
individuals get smarter because they’re connected to the network.”72
C.  The Power of Weak Networks 
 
Another factor affecting the creative power of open networks is the 
strength of the ties between those in the network.  Strong ties are those that 
have longevity, strong emotions, and reciprocity, such as those between 
families and friends.73
 
 67. Id. at 16,385–89. 
  Weak ties, on the other hand, are less time-intensive 
 68. Id. at 16,385. 
 69. Id. at 16,389 (arguing that their “result suggests that diversity in perspective and 
heuristic space should be encouraged” but explaining that there are “communication costs” if 
the problem solvers are not only diverse heuristically but also in perspective because 
“problem solvers with diverse perspectives may have trouble understanding solutions 
identified by other agents.”); Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Problem Solving by Heterogeneous 
Agents, 97 J. ECON. THEORY 123, 130 (2001) (“[G]iven that all individuals agree on the 
value of outcomes, collections of agents outperform individuals partially because people see 
and think about the problems differently.”). 
 70. Charlan J. Nemeth et al., The Liberating Role of Conflict in Group Creativity:  A 
Study in Two Countries, 34 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 365, 373 (2004) (citation omitted) (citing 
generally Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Managing Innovation:  When Less Is More, 40 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 59 (1997)). 
 71. Although it has been shown that group brainstorming is not as productive as 
individual brainstorming if the group does not provide any critical feedback or criticism, 
research has shown that this is not true when the group is given instructions to debate and 
criticizes each other’s ideas during the brainstorming session. See id. at 371–73 (finding that 
groups given instructions to debate the suggestions generated more ideas, and the individuals 
on those teams, on average, produced more additional ideas after the group was disbanded 
than those in groups given no instructions or told not to debate or criticize each other’s 
ideas); see also Nemeth, supra note 70, at 60 (“Minority viewpoints have importance and 
power, not just for the value of the ideas themselves, but for their ability to stimulate creative 
thought.”). See generally Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Dissent as Driving Cognition, Attitudes, 
and Judgments, 13 SOC. COGNITION 273 (1995) (contending that minority disagreement 
increases quality of performance and creativity because multiple perspectives are 
considered). 
 72. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 58. 
 73. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 
(1973); Ruef, supra note 45, at 429.  These are also arguably the kind of ties between 
lawyers and their clients—especially those in the commercial context, in which law firms’ or 
law partners’ client relationships are strong, long-lasting, and require time to cultivate. See 
John C. Coates et al., Hiring Teams, Firms, and Lawyers:  Evidence of the Evolving 
Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1002 (2011). 
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and intimate.74  Perhaps counterintuitively, the network’s creative value 
does not always increase as ties grow stronger; indeed, research shows that 
just the opposite can be true.  Although strong ties can fill disconnects,75 
they can also impede innovation and coerce conformity.76  Family, friends, 
and others with close ties can apply pressure in the relationship.  In contrast, 
weak interpersonal ties free individuals to interact with different 
audiences.77
Thus, there is a power in weak ties.  Not only do they disseminate ideas 
more widely and bridge formerly disconnected groups, but they also foster 
innovation because they “allow for more experimentation in selectively 
combining ideas from one source with those of another and impose fewer 
concerns regarding social conformity.”
 
78  It is the informal, sometimes 
invisible, connections within organizations that bridge disconnected 
functions.79  Because the ties are weak, the information coming across them 
is necessarily from a different context, or as Richard Ogle calls it, a 
different “idea-space.”80  The best “idea-space” has a mix of weak and 
strong ties, a blend of old and new.  This new co-mingled space enables the 
tinkering of parts necessary to create a discovery.81
D.  Open Markets 
 
Although “[c]hance favors the connected mind,”82
 
 74. See Ruef, supra note 
 discovery is not just a 
matter of serendipitous diversity.  Such chance or luck requires the person, 
organization, or profession’s commitment to open and diverse 
45, at 429–30. 
 75. See RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 
27–30 (1992); Ruef, supra note 45, at 430 (explaining that other researchers have claimed 
that “strong ties can also serve as bridges”). 
 76. See Ruef, supra note 45, at 430; see also id. at 445 (finding that teams composed of 
strong-tie networks were less innovative than those with weak-tie networks and suggesting 
that entrepreneurs can avoid conformity by, among other things, “diversifying their networks 
to include a wide range of social contacts”). 
 77. See Granovetter, supra note 73, at 1369–76 (hypothesizing that weak interpersonal 
ties enable individuals to reach different audiences than those reachable via strong ties, and 
that they also increase social mobility and community organization). 
 78. See Ruef, supra note 45, at 430. 
 79. CROSS & PARKER, supra note 45, at vii–viii, 10 (arguing that organization charts do 
not “really capture the way work gets done in their organization”). 
 80. RICHARD OGLE, SMART WORLD:  BREAKTHROUGH CREATIVITY AND THE NEW 
SCIENCE OF IDEAS 13 (2007); see also JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 167. 
 81. See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 167; cf. GOULD, supra note 42, at 24–26 (using the 
development of a panda’s sesamoid thumb and an orchid’s petal to conclude that “[n]ature 
is . . . an excellent tinkerer, not a divine artificer”); Roger Guimerà et al., Team Assembly 
Mechanisms Determine Collaboration Network Structure and Team Performance, 308 
SCIENCE 697, 697–702 (2005) (finding that the most successful Broadway musicals were 
those that had networks made up of both people who knew each other well and had worked 
together before and people who were totally new); Matt Golosinski, Faculty Research:  
Brian Uzzi, MORS:  Teamwork Takes Center Stage, KELLOGG WORLD (Winter 2005), 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/kwo/win05/departments/uzzi.htm (reporting Uzzi and 
his team’s findings); Jennifer Robison, The Power and Potential of Social Networks, 
GALLUP MGMT. J. 2 (Oct. 13, 2010), http://gmj.gallup.com/content/143486/Power-Potential-
Social-Networks.aspx (discussing Uzzi’s work). 
 82. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 174. 
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environments.  As Ruef’s study indicates, those entrepreneurs who 
committed themselves to a life full of diverse networks were three times 
more innovative than those that had more vertical, uniform networks.83  
Many of the most important inventions accredited to one inventor were 
actually developed over time, alongside many different innovators who 
helped refine them.84  It is a commitment to outside influence and open 
collaboration that makes a difference by creating the opportunity for 
serendipity.85
To make this point, Johnson took “two hundred of the most important 
innovations and scientific breakthroughs from the past six hundred years, 
starting with Gutenberg’s press:  everything from Einstein’s theory of 
relativity to the invention of air conditioning to the birth of the World Wide 
Web”
 
86 and plotted them on a four-quadrant diagram.  The quadrants were 
based on whether the developers were individuals and small groups, or 
collaborative multidisciplinary projects, and whether they had an intent to 
make money directly on the sale or licensing of the invention or discovery, 
or a belief in open sourcing, where ideas flow freely in a “non-market.”87  
He found that more innovation happened in the quadrant of networks with 
“non-market” beliefs than in any other quadrant.88  Furthermore, the least 
innovation occurred in the first quadrant, made up of individuals and small 
groups with an intent to market the invention.89  This suggests that “[t]he 
promise of an immense payday encourages people to come up with useful 
innovations, but at the same time it forces people to protect those 
innovations. . . .  And so where innovation is concerned, we have 
deliberately built inefficient markets:  environments that protect copyrights 
and patents and trade secrets.”90  These walled-in environments and 
inefficiencies prevent the number of meetings of the minds that can occur, 
and the potential improvements and transformations that might result.91
 
 83. See Ruef, supra note 
  
This kind of research has led various organizations—from IBM, to Procter 
& Gamble, to Nike—to develop open environments that actually promote 
45, at 443; see also JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 166. 
 84. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 221 (“[E]very important innovation is fundamentally a 
network affair.”). 
 85. See id. at 221; cf. Richard Wiseman, Be Lucky—It’s an Easy Skill to Learn, 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2003, 12:01 AM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
3304496/Be-lucky-its-an-easy-skill-to-learn.html (reporting results from an anecdotal study 
that showed that “unlucky people miss chance opportunities because they are too focused on 
looking for something else,” whereas “[l]ucky people are more relaxed and open, and 
therefore see what is there rather than just what they are looking for”). 
 86. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 218–19. 
 87. Id. at 218–20. 
 88. Id. at 228–30. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 232. 
 91. See id. at 123–24 (“[T]hose walls have been erected with the explicit aim of 
encouraging innovation. . . .  But they share a founding assumption:  that in the long run, 
innovation will increase if you put restrictions on the spread of new ideas, because those 
restrictions will allow the creators to collect large financial rewards from their 
inventions. . . .  The problem with these closed environments is that they inhibit serendipity 
and reduce the overall network of minds that can potentially engage with a problem.”). 
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the sharing of “secret” information with business partners, suppliers, 
customers, and universities.92
What does this all have to do with law and the legal profession?  While 
the U.S. legal profession promulgates walls that suppress creativity, other 
organizations and professions—including foreign legal professions—are 
breaking down such walls.  For example, the U.K. firm Eversheds asked its 
clients to essentially “run the firm,” instead of keeping them in the dark.
 
93  
Eversheds developed a Client Advisory Board to guide the firm and assess 
whether it was meeting its targeted goals.  The Board is currently in its 
ninth year, and both the firm and its clients tout the Board’s success in 
changing the firm.  They credit it for building relationships and for the 
cross-fertilization between client and law firm that has resulted in 
Eversheds’s innovative and award-winning services.94
II.  THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION’S ADHERENCE 
TO CLOSED ENVIRONMENTS 
  In the face of this 
shift toward openness, the U.S. legal profession has yet to experiment with 
a rule structure that embraces the influence of nonlawyers on lawyers. 
Despite the evidence that open, eclectic environments and weak ties 
promote inventiveness, creativity in problem solving, and productivity, the 
U.S. legal profession remains very closed.  Many of its regulations and 
practices discourage the influence of nonlawyers. 
A.  Lawyer Regulation 
Much has been written bemoaning the U.S. bar licensing requirements as 
exclusionary, self-interested, and designed to ensure a monopoly over the 
delivery of legal services.95
 
 92. See id. at 124–25. 
  The same claim has been made about many of 
 93. Client Advisory Board (Dec. 2011) (unpublished proprietary information) (on file 
with author); Interview with Anonymous Client Relations Partner, Eversheds, in London, 
Eng. (Nov. 18, 2011) (the partner requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of these 
materials). 
 94. Eversheds won a Financial Times Innovation Lawyers Award in 2010 and was 
shortlisted for a 2011 Award. See Award Shortlists, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ftconferences.
com/Innovativelawyers/Page/Award-Shortlists (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); FT Innovative 
Lawyers 2010, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ftconferences.com/Innovativelawyers2010/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 95. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
IN MODERN AMERICA 106–09 (1976) (claiming that the ABA raised bar membership 
educational requirements to exclude certain ethnic and racial groups from joining the bar); 
James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale:  The “Acquisition of an Interest and 
Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 242 (2003) 
(“[S]etting higher educational standards for admission to the bar was one means chosen to 
keep the unwanted out of the profession . . . .”); id. at 256–57 (contending that abolishing the 
rules prohibiting lawyers from acquiring an interest in a cause of action and providing 
financial assistance to clients “would close happily one more chapter on the self-
interestedness of bar ethics rules”); Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition:  The 
Unconstitutionality of Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
135, 147–50 (2004) (attributing strict bar admission requirements to “economic 
protectionism”); Waye, supra note 25, at 232 (making the same point about the “barriers to 
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the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the bar’s adherence to the 
theory of self-regulation.96
The Model Rules prohibit several types of interchanges between lawyers 
and nonlawyers.  For example, Rule 5.4 prohibits lawyers from sharing 
legal fees with nonlawyers, and from forming a partnership with 
nonlawyers “if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice 
of law.”
 
97  Essentially, Rule 5.4 prohibits outside investment in, or 
ownership of, law firms—something that is allowed in Australia98 and the 
United Kingdom.99  The rule’s proponents fear that lawyers will succumb 
to pressure from outside investors and the lure of financial gain, instead of 
focusing on the interests of clients or the legal system.100
 
entry and licensing” in Australia); see also Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices:  
How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 47–51 
(2007) (summarizing the relevant scholarship arguing that the legal profession also 
attempted to exclude minorities and women from becoming lawyers). See generally SUSAN 
K. BOYD, THE ABA’S FIRST SECTION:  ASSURING A QUALIFIED BAR (1993) (discussing the 
history of ABA’s accreditation requirements). 
  Moreover, as its 
 96. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text; cf. Green, supra note 17, at 1157 
(“The effort to remove corporations from the field was spearheaded not by clients, but by 
lawyers whose motivations were, explicitly, to protect lawyers against competition from 
corporations and, at least implicitly, to protect the profession’s native-born, middle- and 
upper-class elite against competition from lower-class, urban, immigrant practitioners.”). 
 97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)–(b) (2009).  Some contend that this 
Model Rule is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the 
Delivery of Legal Services:  On the First Amendment Rights of Corporations and 
Individuals, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1800258 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions make 
blanket prohibitions on outside ownership of law firms unconstitutional).  The law firm 
Jacoby & Meyers has filed three virtually identical lawsuits in New Jersey, New York, and 
Connecticut making these contentions. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss, Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Presiding Justices, No. 11 Civ. 
3387, 2012 WL 751946 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 3387), 2011 WL 7102194; 
Nathan Koppel, Jacoby & Meyers Fights to Let Nonlawyers Buy In, WALL ST. J., May 19, 
2011, at B1.  On March 8, 2012, Judge Lewis Kaplan dismissed the New York lawsuit as 
seeking an unconstitutional advisory decision because other New York laws prohibited 
outside investment and “plaintiffs could not accept non-lawyer equity investments even if 
they won on the merits of their constitutional claims.” Jacoby & Meyers, 2012 WL 751946, 
at *1.  In North Carolina, state senator Fletcher L. Hartsell, Jr. has drafted a bill that would 
allow nonlawyer investment in corporate law firms in his state, contending that the existing 
ban is unconstitutional. See S. 254, Gen. Assemb., 2011–12 Sess. (N.C. 2011), available at 
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/Senate/PDF/S254v0.pdf. 
 98. Alexia Garamfalvi, In a First, Law Firm Goes Public, LEGAL TIMES (May 22, 2007), 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20090304195009/http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1179751700602 (archived and currently available at LexisNexis in “The National 
Law Journal (Online)” database). 
 99. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pt. 5 (U.K.) (enabling equity investment in law 
firms in England and Wales by nonlawyer investors).  For a comprehensive history of the 
Act, see generally Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism:  Global Law 
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 465 (2008). 
 100. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money:  Outside Investment in Law 
Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 407, 415 (2009) (explaining the history of the rule).  As 
Regan points out, however, “restricting . . . law firm ownership . . . is inapt in a world in 
which lawyers increasingly are viewed as but one group of professional service providers 
among many.” Id. at 408; see also Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal 
Profession:  The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. 
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title, “Professional Independence of a Lawyer,” suggests, Rule 5.4 is 
designed to ensure that outsiders do not taint lawyers’ professional 
judgment.101
Furthermore, Rule 5.4 directly prohibits the formation of 
multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs) with nonlawyers, in which lawyers 
share fees with nonlawyers and offer both legal and non-legal services 
under one roof.
  Thus, as will be discussed in Part III, it is also used as an 
argument against claim funding. 
102  The rationale for this prohibition is that MDPs will 
create conflicts of interest, damage the reputation of the legal profession, 
risk the attorney-client privilege, and taint a lawyer’s independent 
judgment.103  Of course, it also happens to protect the profession’s 
economic self-interest.104  Thus, law firms may create ancillary businesses 
that provide non-legal service performed by nonlawyers, and they can hire 
nonlawyers, but nonlawyers cannot own stock in a law firm nor receive 
profits from the partnership.105  The most recent ABA proposal, which 
recommends allowing some outside ownership of law firms, epitomizes the 
U.S. stance:  it is willing to embrace outside influence only if it protects the 
financial status of the profession and if the outsiders’ influence on lawyers 
is severely restricted.106
 
PROF. LAW. 189, 209 (explaining that if lawyers want to be treated differently, they need to 
justify how it is in clients’ or society’s interest).  But as Green points out,  
 
[T]he assumption that lawyers would submit to such influence is at odds with the 
most fundamental assumption of lawyer professionalism and self-regulation:  that 
lawyers’ professional training and character, as certified by the licensing process, 
together with the disciplinary process and other institutions of internal regulation, 
are sufficient to ensure lawyers’ adherence to their professional obligations to 
clients and the public. 
Green, supra note 17, at 1154. 
 101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4, cmt. 1 (making clear that its restrictions 
are designed to “protect the lawyer’s professional independence of judgment”); see also 
supra notes 17–18. 
 102. In 1999, the ABA Commission recommended revising Rule 5.4 to allow MDPs, but 
the ABA House of Delegates rejected this recommendation in July 2000.  Report and 
Recommendation of the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on Multidisciplinary 
Practice, D.C. BAR, http://www.dcbar.org/inside_the_bar/structure/reports/special_
committee_on_multidisciplinary_practice/background.cfm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 103. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law:  Does the One Who 
Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 600–16 (1989) (examining and 
criticizing the justifications for the rules that limit lawyers’ ability to partner with 
nonlawyers); Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Taking the Business Out of Work Product, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1869, 1883 (2011) (“Ironically, these are the same arguments that were 
used—unsuccessfully—against allowing in-house counsel, ancillary businesses, and lawyers 
to join legal services organizations.”). 
 104. Andrews, supra note 103, at 616–21; cf. Green, supra note 17, at 1155–56 
(predicting, among other things, that “[t]he bar will continue its effort to expand its 
professional turf” and only embrace collaboration with nonlawyers “in forms in which 
lawyers would be economically and professionally dominant” but will continue to “employ 
the rhetoric of lawyer independence . . . to promote lawyers’ economic dominance”). 
 105. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4. 
 106. The ABA’s most recent proposal is to adopt rules similar to those that exist in 
Washington, D.C., which allows some nonlawyer ownership of law firms as long as lawyers 
maintain a controlling financial interest and voting rights, and nonlawyers do not have their 
own clients or offer any nonlegal services to clients. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, 
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In addition, other rules may also inhibit open interaction and alliances 
between lawyers and nonlawyers.  Consider Rule 1.6, “Confidentiality of 
Information.”107  This rule states that the lawyer owes the client a duty to 
not reveal any information related to the representation without informed 
consent.108  Yet, the only real way to get informed consent is to tell the 
client all the possible negative consequences from disclosure.109
Rule 1.6 also interacts with both the work-product and attorney-client 
privilege doctrines, which protect information from disclosure to 
adversaries in litigation.  Although these doctrines do allow disclosures to 
third-party consultants and experts in certain circumstances, courts interpret 
these exceptions narrowly and often consider the protective doctrines 
waived or inapplicable if information is shared with third-parties.
  Arguably, 
this restriction could inhibit communication. 
110  
Protection under the attorney-client privilege, in particular, is harder to 
garner when the lawyer’s advice is a mixture of business and law.111  Under 
most courts’ narrow interpretations of the privilege, it rarely, if ever, covers 
the type of collaborative communications with external consultants that can 
enhance decision making and problem solving.112
 
Report on Alternative Law Practice Structures (Discussion Draft Dec. 2, 2011), in Letter 
from Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, Co-Chairs, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, to 
ABA Entities et al. (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-
ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf; Joe Palazzolo, ABA Inches Closer to 
Vote on Nonlawyers Owning Stake in Firms, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2011, 3:27 P.M.), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/06/aba-inches-closer-to-vote-on-nonlawyers-owning-
stake-in-firms/. 
  Given that case law and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that the work-product 
 107. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6. 
 108. Id.  This duty lasts forever—except when the lawyer is sued by the client for 
malpractice or attempting to recover legal fees. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and 
Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 10 (1998) (“Confidentiality means everything in 
legal ethics unless lawyers lose money, in which case it means nothing.”); David A. Green, 
Lawyers as “Tattletales”:  A Challenge to the Broad Application of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 636–38 
(2004). 
 109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) & cmt. 6. 
 110. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:  Third-
Rate Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 760–63 (2009) (arguing 
that the courts’ narrow construction of the exception “bars protection for most 
communications with most third-party consultants”); Beardslee, supra note 103, at 1929 
(contending that the work-product doctrine “fails to provide predictable protection for the 
responsibilities and obligations of the contemporary corporate attorney”). 
 111. The attorney-client privilege protects only mixed communications that are 
“predominantly legal,” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. 
Del. 1954), or “made primarily for the purpose of generating legal advice,” McCaugherty v. 
Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 240 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see Beardslee, supra note 110, at 751–
52.  Making this determination, however, is extremely complicated in the corporate context, 
given that in-house counsel usually provide mixed business and law advice. See id. at 752–
55. 
 112. The majority view is that the third party exception only applies to third parties with 
“ministerial responsibility” or who merely translate information and do not provide any 
increment of their own knowledge or expertise. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 
(2d Cir. 1961); Beardslee, supra note 110, at 745–46 & n.83. 
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doctrine protects materials prepared by nonlawyers, and is not waived 
unless disclosure increases the chances of exposure to an adversary,113 the 
doctrine would appear to be the legal profession’s “secret door” to a “third 
place”—a license to brainstorm with nonlawyers to find more innovative, 
effective solutions to clients’ problems.  Unfortunately, courts often deny 
such protection if the nonlawyer professionals who created the work 
behaved as a typical business consultant.114  These doctrines exacerbate the 
pressures to restrict access to materials and are part of the frame of 
reference in applying Rule 1.6.  Lawyers thus may decide to be cautious 
and not share information with others, even if it would greatly benefit case 
strategy, management, or financing.115
Another example of a seemingly good rule gone bad is Rule 5.5, which 
prohibits the “Unauthorized Practice of Law”
  They share confidential information 
at their own—and their clients’—peril. 
116 (UPL).  On its face, this 
rule and corollary state bans appear to protect clients and the public, but it is 
a bait and switch.  “Practice of law” has been construed very broadly to 
include accounting, insurance, marriage counseling, real estate brokering, 
business consulting, and loan and mortgage brokering.117  Although it is 
likely accurate to include such services as part of the holistic legal service 
that lawyers provide,118 and likely desirable to exclude outsiders who are 
incompetent or a danger to the client, UPL restrictions ultimately exclude 
outsiders who are neither, and thus create a monopoly for lawyers, as  Judge 
Richard Posner and others have pointed out.119
 
 113. See, e.g., Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:07-Civ. 565, 2:08-Civ 478, 
2011 WL 1714304, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) (concluding that a party could share 
information with a third-party claim funder without waiving work-product doctrine 
protection); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 530–32 (3d ed. 2010).  The test for waiver of the work-
product doctrine is much different than the test for waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 
See Beardslee, supra note 
  Green explains, “[O]ver 
103, at 1898–99.  The author is currently writing another article on 
waiver and the common interest doctrine as it relates to claim funding. 
 114. Beardslee, supra note 103, at 1913–15 (providing examples from recent cases 
involving public relations consultants to support this contention). 
 115. Beardslee, supra note 110, at 763–64. 
 116. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2009). 
 117. See Green, supra note 17, at 1149 (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., 
Op. 206 (Nov. 22, 1971)). 
 118. In some ways, such a broad definition makes sense given that clients seek lawyers’ 
services for more than what could traditionally be called ‘legal’ advice. See Beardslee, supra 
note 110, at 736–42; Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely:  The Risks and Rewards of 
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 217, 281 (2000) (“The needs of clients are increasingly difficult to pigeonhole 
as ‘legal,’ ‘accounting,’ ‘financial planning,’ ‘environmental planning,’ etc.  And the 
boundaries between the law and other disciplines are blurring.”). 
 119. See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1993) 
(“The legal profession in its traditional form is a cartel of providers of services related to 
society’s laws.”); id. at 1 (describing “[t]he profession [as] an intricately and ingeniously 
reticulated, though imperfect, cartel,” protected by “[g]overmental regulations designed to 
secure the cartel against competition and new entry from without”); see also George W.C. 
McCarter, The ABA’s Attack on “Unauthorized” Practice of Law and Consumer Choice, 
ENGAGE, May 2003, at 131, 132 (“[S]cholars who have examined the data have consistently 
found no genuine threat to the public from lay provision of legal services.”); Deborah L. 
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time, the effect of the bar association rulings became less to protect the 
professional elite from lower-class competitors than to protect all lawyers 
against competition from nonlawyers . . . and, beyond that, to expand 
lawyers’ turf.”120  These rules not only deter nonlawyers from practicing 
law, but they also discourage lawyers from collaborating with nonlawyers.  
Because the dividing line is so obscure, lawyers may not want to risk aiding 
the unauthorized practice of law, or may not want to assume the 
responsibility for supervising nonlawyers’ work that would be necessary to 
eliminate that risk.121
The way that the Model Rules are enforced is also consistent with the 
idea of an independent and closed profession.  Those in the legal profession 
often claim that they are “self-regulated” because the bar regulates and 
disciplines itself.
 
122  Even though the legal profession may not, in practice, 
be solely self-regulating,123 the theory of self-regulation presupposes a 
focus on the individual lawyer and on lawyers as a professional entity 
distinct from other regulated bodies.124  Thus, the legal profession’s 
continued adherence to the theory of self-regulation perpetuates self-
interested behavior and the notion that clients and society are better off with 
lawyers that work apart—without the influence, experience, and guidance 
of others.125
Even the way in which the Model Rules and their state counterparts are 
written exemplifies the legal profession’s unwavering attachment to the 
idea of the lone lawyer—the one-to-one, lawyer-client model.  Despite the 
 
 
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of 
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1981) (“Although the organized 
bar has often suggested that the campaign against lay practitioners ‘arose as the result of a 
public demand,’ the consensus among historians is to the contrary.” (quoting John C. 
Satterfield, The President’s Page, 48 A.B.A. J. 99, 112 (1962))). See generally Green, supra 
note 17, at 1143–44 (tracing the history of the unauthorized practice of law rule). 
 120. Green, supra note 17, at 1144. 
 121. Cf. id. at 1144 n.153 (“[T]he bar probably assumed that if lawyers were free to ally 
with other professionals, clients would favor nonlawyer-dominated firms over both law firms 
and lawyer-dominated multidisciplinary partnerships.”). 
 122. Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark, & Tahlia Gordon, Trends and Challenges in Lawyer 
Regulation:  The Impact of Globalization and Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2661, 2669 
(2012) (“[T]he term ‘self-regulation’ is ambiguous and means different things to different 
people.”). 
 123. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 
807–09 (1992). 
 124. See Terry, Mark, & Gordon, supra note 122, at 2672 (“‘[S]elf-regulation’ and 
independence have been a fundamental part of lawyers’ self-identity for many decades, if not 
centuries.”); Wilkins, supra note 123, at 853–55 (“[T]he claim that there is an inherent link 
between the [self-regulatory] disciplinary system and the status of lawyers as ‘independent 
professionals’ is firmly rooted in precedent, practice, and professional mythology.”); cf. 
Terry, supra note 100, at 189 (“In the service providers paradigm, the legal profession is not 
viewed as a separate, unique profession entitled to its own individual regulations, but is 
included in a broader group of ‘service providers,’ all of whom can be regulated together.”). 
 125. Cf. Regan, supra note 100, at 408 (“There has been ample criticism for some time 
that relying heavily on self-regulation provides too much opportunity for self-interested 
behavior and too little consideration of important social values served by the practice of law.  
Restricting . . . professional regulation to lawyers rests on and perpetuates the assumption 
that only lawyers are fit to determine the obligations to which they will be subject.”). 
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fact that a significant portion of U.S. lawyers work in law firms, which are 
large, diffuse enterprises with complicated organizational structures, the 
rules of professional conduct in all but two states are written for the 
individual lawyer who works in solo practice or at a firm with a classic 
partnership model.126
B.  The Structure of Large Corporate Law Practice 
  These rules are essentially a manual written for a 
knight working alone to slay a dragon, rather than an army of varied 
professionals working together to do the same. 
The way that many large law firms are organized also discourages a flow 
of information between lawyers and nonlawyers, and even among lawyers.  
The standard U.S. law firm, which, according to Milton C. Regan, is now a 
“mixture of partnership and corporation,” is in many ways a monolith.127  
Although there have been some changes to management structure of large 
law firms and the classic partnership model has been replaced,128 typically 
they are made up of, owned, and mostly run by lawyers.129  This structure 
was designed to protect clients130 from, among other things, agency 
problems, such as lawyers pursuing their own interests over their clients 
interests131 and what David B. Wilkins calls the “externality” problem—the 
likelihood that “lawyers and clients together [will] impose unjustified harms 
on third parties or on the legal framework.”132
This structure, however, results in disaggregation within firms.
 
133
 
 126. See id. at 431. 
  While 
it is true that lawyers frequently work in teams, many firms today are so 
 127. Id. at 407, 417 (explaining that its current form stems from the classic partnership 
model that “conceptualizes the law firm as a voluntary association of partners who share 
equally in the outcomes of a common venture, who participate as equals in self-governance 
through consensus”). 
 128. See id. at 421–24 (explaining the ways that most law firms have departed from the 
classic partnership model); id. at 423 (“Firms are moving closer to a corporate model:  
distinct separation of ownership and control, multiple categories of workers and lines of 
authority, greater standardization of tasks, productivity-based compensation, limited 
individual liability, and reliance on temporary workers that mimics corporate ‘just in time’ 
production processes.”). 
 129. Cf. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, 
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
559, 565 (2002) (studying the emerging role of in-house compliance specialists and noting 
“the wide variation in [their] titles,” such as “general counsel,” “ethics partner,” “conflicts 
partner,” and “loss prevention partner”); Regan, supra note 100, at 427–28 (“[F]irms have 
concentrated management authority in executive committees; hired non-lawyers for 
positions such as chief administrative officer and chief marketing officer; established general 
counsel positions; designated specific partners as ethics or loss prevention counsel . . . .”). 
 130. See Regan, supra note 100, at 419–20 (explaining how the structure is designed to 
alleviate various costs and externalities). 
 131. See Wilkins, supra note 123, at 819–20. 
 132. Id. at 820. 
 133. Cf. Regan, supra note 100, at 428 (“[T]o serve as an attractive investment (to outside 
investors), a firm will need to rely less on individual rainmakers and more on the 
performance of the firm as a whole. . . .  This means adopting measures that integrate 
members more securely within the firm, and taking steps to increase loyalty and commitment 
to reinforce that integration.”).  On a recent virtual session for LawWithoutWalls, Jordan 
Furlong of Law21 made the points that law firms have a “weak and fragmented culture” and 
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large and global that they work as “weakly integrated networks of 
cobranded teams,” as opposed to integrated companies that focus on the 
performance of the firm as a whole:  “Law firms are typically organized as 
nested pyramids with little cross-cutting communication or sharing of 
tasks.”134  Moreover, many employ an “eat what you kill” compensation 
system that compensates lawyers based on their individual contributions to 
the firm’s profits.135  Further exacerbating the problem is the mistaken 
belief that clients hire lawyers and not law firms.136  Whether this notion is 
true or not, its popularity affects internal structure and behavior.  As a 
result, regardless of the way law may actually be practiced,137
C. Tension with Actual Practice 
 the historical 
law firm structure appears to prize individual work (or little monopolies) 
over collaborative, integrated, multidisciplinary teamwork. 
With respect to collaboration between lawyers and nonlawyers, there is 
tension between the legal profession’s traditional values and the current 
mode of practicing law.138  Many corporate lawyers, especially in-house 
counsel, find that they must work on multidisciplinary teams and 
collaborate with nonlawyers to provide legal advice.139
 
“share knowledge grudgingly, if at all.” Jordan Furlong, Remarks in LawWithoutWalls 
Virtual Thought Leader Session:  Law Firm Structure:  Then, Now, and the Future (Mar. 14, 
2012) (presentation on file with author). 
  
 134. Coates et al., supra note 73, at 1003. 
 135. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE FALL OF A WALL 
STREET LAWYER (2004). 
 136. See generally Coates et al., supra note 73 (reporting and discussing research 
indicating that, although many general counsels claim that they hire lawyers, not firms, in 
reality they base hiring and firing decisions not only on individuals, but also on firms and the 
teams and departments within firms). 
 137. It is certainly true that many of today’s large corporate law firm lawyers regularly 
work with experts from other disciplines to provide comprehensive legal services to clients, 
and that law firms are increasingly utilizing nonlawyers in a variety of functions, including 
electronic discovery, marketing data management, operations, compliance, and ethics, to 
help run their firms more efficiently and profitably.  Although some may argue that this is 
not true collaboration, because the lawyers continue to completely control decisions and 
client fees, it is an example of the attempt to collaborate despite the regulatory constraints.  
Swapping the incentives by encouraging rather than discouraging such interaction is at least 
worth considering. 
 138. Today, although there might be a lead partner on a corporate law case, and some of 
legal practice is still mired in non-cooperative behavior, there are many different levels of 
lawyers and different service providers involved in managing a case—not to mention a 
relationship partner to ensure that the relationship with the client is being handled well.  
Further, there is research that shows that when star lawyers move firms, general counsels are 
more apt to follow them when they move in teams. See Coates et al., supra note 73, at 1028. 
 139. Indeed, the exception to waiver for communications between attorneys and third-
party consultants was created because “the complexities of modern existence prevent 
attorneys from effectively handling clients’ affairs without the help of others.” United States 
v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); see also NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 
109, 140–42 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (acknowledging that “[e]ven the most proficient and prolific 
attorneys have to resort to consultation with others in order to render full and complete legal 
services to their clients,” but ultimately deciding that the exception did not apply to the facts 
at hand).  As Robert E. Rosen points out, this is the “age of consultants,” and lawyers need 
to—and often do—consult with nonlawyers to provide comprehensive advice to clients. 
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Thus, the legal profession has not evaded the team concept or decided 
that nonlawyer influence is a necessary evil.  But its regulations and 
structure define “team” in a closed manner as a team of lawyers and legal 
service providers, as opposed to a team made up of lawyers and 
professionals from other disciplines.  This narrow definition inhibits 
nonlawyer influence over lawyers.  Further, lawyering is oriented around an 
artificial distinction between legal advice and “other” services (for example, 
business, strategic, financial) when clients clearly want something more 
holistic and integrated.140
The time has come to rethink the implications of these types of rules and 
perhaps revise them.  The bar should design rules that foster open 
environments that promote innovation in legal services, case management, 
and problem solving.  Lawyers will only be able to expand their influence 
and economic and qualitative value if they endorse input by nonlawyers—
for that is how innovation and change in legal services will be created and 
adopted. 
 
III.  AN EXAMPLE OF NONLAWYER INFLUENCE EMBRACED 
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES:  CLAIM FUNDING 
Although many lawyers in the United States work with nonlawyers and 
may take issue with this Article’s critique of the U.S. legal profession, the 
reality is that they are doing so despite existing regulations and practices 
that constrain such behavior.  The goal of this Article is not to judge how 
lawyers actually practice or want to practice, but to critique the rules, 
regulations, and structures that U.S. lawyers have collectively chosen to 
adopt.  These rules may be motivated to protect lawyers’ independence, but 
by doing so, they trap U.S. lawyers in a closed market and bar the door to 
exaptation. 
Yet these rules are not inherent to the practice of law—indeed, law 
practice in Australia and the United Kingdom prove otherwise.  It is not that 
these other constituencies do not believe in the importance of lawyer 
independence.  Like the ABA in the United States, regulatory agencies in 
other countries also want to protect clients from lawyers who may be 
affected by personal or professional bias.141
 
Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants Now”:  How Change in Client Organizational 
Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 637, 648, 656–60 (2002); see also Beardslee, supra note 
  Nevertheless, these foreign 
110, at 736–42 (discussing 
“the importance of third-party consultation to the provision of legal advice”). 
 140. It is not just that the law governing lawyers does not enable lawyers to seek input 
from nonlawyers in other areas of business.  It also restricts lawyers themselves from playing 
a dual role—one that mixes legal and business advice—that arguably is inevitable for many, 
if not most, corporate counsel today. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126 (“In today’s world, an 
attorney’s acumen is sought at every turn, even average attorneys mix legal advice with 
business, economic, and political.”). 
 141. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN SOLICITORS’ CONDUCT RULES R. 17 (Law Council of Austl. 
2011), available at http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?
file_uuid=D997CD53-92D0-1795-82F7-5436F67E9BCD&siteName=lca (prohibiting 
solicitors from acting “as the mere mouthpiece of the client”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT & PRACTICE R. 13 (Law Council of Austl. 2002), available at 
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regulatory bodies recognize the value of nonlawyer influence on the legal 
profession and collaboration with nonlawyers.142  Unlike the United States, 
both Australia and the United Kingdom embrace outside investment in law 
firms.  The Australian Legal Profession Acts permit lawyers to share 
revenues and income with nonlawyers in Australia.143  Similarly, the 2007 
U.K. Legal Services Act permits U.K. lawyers to develop alternative 
business structures, in which lawyers and nonlawyers can form legal 
partnerships and/or companies offering both legal and non-legal services.144  
Thus, despite sharing the United States’ value of professional 
independence, both the Australian and the U.K. legal professions believe 
that varying levels of nonlawyer influence on lawyers can provide benefits 
to clients and consumers, such as an opportunity for financial innovation.145
 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=01EC79F6-
1C23-CACD-2252-D298393FBFA0&siteName=lca (same for both solicitors and barristers); 
AUSTRALIAN BAR ASS’N MODEL RULES R. 18 (2002), available at 
http://www.austbar.asn.au/images/stories/PDFs/CurrentABAModelRules2002.pdf (same for 
barristers). 
  
The U.S. regulations permit much less nonlawyer influence on lawyers than 
 142. Conducting a thorough comparison of all of the regulations, rules, and structures 
addressed in Part II with those in Australia and the United Kingdom is outside the scope of 
this Article. 
 143. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ch 2, s 128(1) (“Nothing under this Act 
prevents an Australian legal practitioner from sharing with an incorporated legal practice 
receipts, revenue or other income arising from the provision of legal services by the 
practitioner.”); see also id. s 111(1) (defining “incorporated legal practice” as “[a] 
corporation . . . [that] engages in legal practice in this jurisdiction, whether or not it provides 
services that are not legal services”).  Every Australian state and territory but South Australia 
has passed a similar act based on the Model Legal Profession Bill. The Model Legal 
Profession Bill:  Status of Implementation, L. COUNCIL AUSTL., http://www.lawcouncil.
asn.au/programs/national_profession/model-bill.cfm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see also 
Christine Parker, Peering over the Ethical Precipice:  Incorporation, Listing and the Ethical 
Responsibilities of Law Firms 6 & n.15 (Melbourne Law Sch., Legal Stud. Research Paper 
No. 339, 2008), available at http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/download.cfm?
DownloadFile=7FFE4F7F-D062-CC9B-20BF53A0F42BD562 (noting that the six states that 
had passed the Legal Profession Act as of 2008 permitted incorporation of law firms).  Of 
course, there are some special requirements.  For example, the Act requires that a legal 
director be appointed to manage the legal services of the corporation and ensure that the 
corporation complies with (and nonlawyers do not prevent compliance with) the lawyers’ 
professional obligations. See Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ch 2, s 117. 
 144. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, pt. 5 (U.K.); LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007:  
EXPLANATORY NOTES pt. 5, ¶ 178 (2007), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2007/29/notes/data.pdf. 
 145. See Parker, supra note 143, at 13 (explaining that capital can be raised more quickly 
and efficiently, and that clients have more legal services options); Steve Mark, The 
Corporatisation of Law Firms—Conflicts of Interests for Publicly Listed Law Firms 1 (Oct. 
13, 2007) [hereinafter Mark, Corporatisation of Law Firms] (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/Corporatisation
_of_Law_Firms_Conflicts_of_interests_for_publicly_listed_law_firms_October_2007.doc/$
file/Corporatisation_of_Law_Firms_Conflicts_of_interests_for_publicly_listed_law_firms_
October_2007.doc.  In Australia, outside investment in firms has innovated corporate law; 
according to Steve Mark, it has turned corporate law on its head. See Steve Mark, Remarks 
in LawWithoutWalls Virtual Thought Leader Session:  Law Firm Structure:  Then, Now, 
and the Future (Mar. 14, 2002) (PowerPoint presentation on file with author).  It has changed 
what duties public corporations owe to shareholders and at the same time managed the risks 
identified above. See Mark, Corporatisation of Law Firms, supra, at 12–13. 
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those of these other countries.  This is exemplified by its stance on outside 
investment in claims, also known as claim funding.  
Claim funding is nonrecourse financing in which third parties provide 
funding for a legal claim in exchange for a share of the proceeds from the 
judgment or settlement.146  In this scenario, the third-party funder assumes 
the risk—if the claim is not successful, the third party cannot recover the 
funds advanced.147  Claim funding is considered a fledgling industry in the 
United States,148
This Article is only concerned with commercial claim funding, as 
opposed to individual or consumer claim funding.
 but it has existed for much longer in other countries.  
There are different kinds of legal claim funding, and many laws regulating 
when and how capital can be invested in litigation, which vary by country 
and by regions within countries. 
149  Commercial claim 
funders offer different deals in different situations:  the level, type, and 
timing of funding can vary; the contract can be with the claimholder or the 
lawyer;150 and the funders’ percentage of the recovery after the principle 
can vary from a flat percentage to a waterfall approach, under which the 
percentage increases as rates of return increase.  Some claim funders 
purchase portions of the claim asset itself, while others purchase an interest 
in the outcome—the proceeds of the claim asset.  Additionally, some newer 
players offer value-added services in addition to funding.151  Lastly, 
commercial claim funding arrangements differ in the level of influence and 
control the funders exert over the management of the case.152
The following sections provide snapshots of the status of commercial 
claim funding in Australia and the United Kingdom.  It then compares them 
to the state of the industry in the United States.  As will be explicated 
below, the level of acceptance of claim funding varies greatly, with the 
 
 
 146. ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 6 (using the term “alternative litigation 
finance”). 
 147. See id. at 7. 
 148. See infra notes 212–14 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra note 22. 
 150. See, e.g., Legal Asset Funding, LLC v. Veneski, No. 3:04-Civ. 01156, 2006 WL 
2623884, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2006) (describing a financing agreement in which the 
funder purchased an attorney’s interest in a contingency fee).  Commercial claim funding 
agreements between funders and lawyers (or law firms) are rarer and more problematic from 
an ethical and public policy standpoint.  Because they raise different questions, funding 
contracts between funders and lawyers or firms are outside the scope of this Article.  Instead, 
this Article focuses on funding agreements with corporations or governmental entities. 
 151. Sometimes these services are included as part of the contract with the claimholder 
and therefore appear to be more conditional than optional—that is, a condition for the 
funding.  Other times, funders provide these services in addition to those in the contract and 
therefore are completely optional. 
 152. See Sebok, supra note 16, at 109 (explaining that “[t]he degree of control the 
investor obtained by contract can, in theory, extend over a spectrum ranging from relatively 
minor control (for example, control over what documents the investor can see) to almost 
complete control (for example, control over selection of counsel or veto power over 
settlement)”); Waye, supra note 25, at 236 (explaining that “[t]he arrangements made 
between litigation funders, claim holders and legal practitioners vary in the degree of control 
exerted by the funder over the prosecution of the claim, and in relation to the nature of 
financial arrangements funders make with legal practitioners”). 
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United States being the least tolerant of the three.  That said, it appears that 
commercial claims are a real asset class and that there is a sizeable market 
for commercial claims across the globe.153
A.  Australia 
 
Commercial claim funding is widely allowed in Australia, where most 
jurisdictions have statutorily eliminated champerty.154
In Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd.,
  Indeed, in most of 
Australia, third-party funders are allowed to control any and all aspects of 
the litigation.  Even in jurisdictions that have not abolished champerty, 
Australian courts have avoided finding agreements with commercial claim 
funders champertous because other doctrines exist to prevent outsiders, who 
want to use the court system to harass or ruin competitors, from misusing 
the courts. 
155 the High Court 
of Australia confirmed that arrangements allowing funders to provide all 
instructions to the solicitors, settle the claim for no less than 75 percent of 
the amount claimed, and receive up to 33.3 percent of any amount that the 
claimants recovered were neither against public policy nor an abuse of the 
court’s process.156  On the contrary, they actually improved access to 
justice.  As Justice Michael Kirby, concurring in the court’s judgment, 
explained, “A litigation funder . . . does not invent the rights.  It merely 
organises those asserting such rights so that they can secure access to a 
court of justice that will rule on their entitlements one way or the other, 
according to law.”157  He emphasized that “the alternative is that very many 
persons . . . are unable to recover upon those claims in accordance with 
their legal rights.”158  The court found it “hardly surprising” that such 
investors would want to control the litigation,159 but believed that other 
existing doctrines regulating abuse of process and lawyers’ conflicting 
duties were sufficient to ensure that agreements were not champertous.160
 
 153. The value of claim funders’ investments in U.S. lawsuits has been estimated to 
exceed $1 billion. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors Share in 
the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1. 
  
Thus, the Australian courts recognize “[t]he importance of not preventing 
‘humble men’ from receiving ‘contributions to meet a powerful 
 154. See Wayne Attrill, Ethical Issues in Litigation Funding, CLAIMS FUNDING INT’L 1, 2 
(Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.claimsfunding.eu/uploads/media/Ethical_Issues_Paper.pdf; see 
infra note 187 and accompanying text (defining champerty). 
 155. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.). 
 156. See id. at 414–15, 433–34 (Gummow, Hayne, & Crennan JJ). 
 157. Id. at 468 (Kirby J). 
 158. Id. at 442. 
 159. Id. at 433–34 (Gummow, Hayne, & Crennan JJ). 
 160. See id. at 435 (“Why is that fear [of champerty] not sufficiently addressed by 
existing doctrines of abuse of process and other procedural and substantive elements of the 
court’s processes?  And if lawyers undertake obligations that may give rise to conflicting 
duties there is no reason proffered for concluding that present rules regulating lawyers’ 
duties to the court and to clients are insufficient to meet the difficulties that are suggested 
might arise.”). 
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adversary,’”161 even if, to receive those funds, there will be certain 
conditions that enable the funder to influence the manner in which the claim 
is resolved.162
Given these types of decisions, there is an expanding market for 
commercial claim funders in Australia.
 
163  There are at least five third-party 
funding companies, comprising approximately 95 percent of the market.164  
One, IMF (Australia) Ltd., is listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.165  
IMF has grown at a rate of 100 percent per year since listing and it 
represents claims of more than A$1 billion.166  As of 2006, Australian 
claim funders have collectively invested approximately A$20 million per 
year.167  Further, the Law Council of Australia has recommended that the 
price of the funding should not be regulated, but instead should be left up to 
the market and funders’ level of acceptable risk, such as insurance 
premiums.168  Apparently, a new asset class has emerged in the Australian 
capital markets.169
 
 161. Id. at 482–83 & n.416 (Kirby J) (quoting Martell v. Consett Iron Co. Ltd., [1955] 1. 
Ch. 363 at 386 (Danckwerts J.) (Eng.)). 
 
 162. See Domson Pty Ltd. v Zhu [2005] NSWSC 1070, ¶¶ 74–77 (Austl.).  In Domson, 
the court rebuked the plaintiff claimholder’s argument that its agreement with the funder was 
champertous and that it did not have to pay because of the degree of control given to the 
funder. See id. ¶¶ 72–77.  It said that “no public policy was in fact infringed” and that “[i]t 
sits ill in the mouth of [the plaintiff] to submit that the agreement could have given rise to an 
abuse of process” since “[t]he funding arrangement . . . assisted [the plaintiff] in ultimately 
establishing a meritorious claim.” Id. ¶ 78. 
 163. See, e.g., Nikki Tait, Party Funds Backing $174M Claim Against Auditor, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at 1 (“Litigation funding . . . has become more established in some 
overseas jurisdictions, notably Australia.”). 
 164. See LAW COUNCIL AUSTL., STANDING COMM. OF ATT’YS-GEN., LITIGATION FUNDING 
6 (Sept. 14, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 STANDING COMM. SUBMISSION], available at 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=8C744AB2-
1C23-CACD-2297-5D181CEBB545&siteName=lca. 
 165. See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing:  Another Subprime Industry that Has 
a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 107 (2008). 
 166. See id.; Virginia Marsh, Australian Company Pioneers Approach, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 
2007, at 3. 
 167. Martin, supra note 165, at 109 & n.204 (citing John Walker, Litigation Funding for 
Consumers of Civil Justice System Services, IMF (AUSTL.) LTD 3 (Nov. 1, 2006), available 
at http://www.imf.com.au/pdf/LitigationFundingForConsumers.pdf). 
 168. See LAW COUNCIL AUSTL., STANDING COMM. OF ATT’YS-GEN., LITIGATION FUNDING 
7–9 (Oct. 6, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 STANDING COMM. SUBMISSION], available at 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=FFCE6A85-
1C23-CACD-224A-8A0F93EC7C7C&siteName=lca (discussing the Law Council’s 
recommendations); see also Martin, supra note 165, at 111.  In Australia, commercial claim 
funders provide the same benefits and offerings as insurance carriers, such as legal strategy 
services and decision making, finance, and indemnification. See id. at 109. 
 169. See Monica Porter, The Jury’s Out over Third-Party Investment in Legal Actions, 
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at 6 (describing commercial claim funding as “a new asset class for 
adventurous investors”); Michael Legg et al., Litigation Funding in Australia 41 (Univ. of 
N.S.W. Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper No. 12, 2010), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1207&context=unswwps (“[L]itigation 
funding has a bright future in Australia.”). 
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B.  The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, third-party funding of litigation was not allowed 
until 1967,170 when the Criminal Law Act of 1967171 abolished torts and 
crimes for maintenance and champerty.172  As the Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) points out, the statute did not abolish the doctrine of champerty in 
practice.  Instead, “champerty survives as a rule of public policy capable of 
rendering a contract unenforceable.”173  Thus, U.K. courts will consider the 
level of involvement of the funder, the time at which the agreement was 
made, the share of the recovery allotted to the funder, and the importance of 
increasing access to justice—which the courts generally believe agreements 
with third-party funders do—in determining whether to enforce claim 
funding agreements.174
Generally, U.K. courts uphold agreements with funders as long as they 
do not play too active of a role in controlling the litigation,
 
175 but this 
determination can be difficult to make.  For instance, in Queen ex rel. 
Factortame v. Secretary of State for Transport,176 the court upheld a 
funding agreement with a third-party funder, who had counseled the 
claimholder and lawyers on settlement, advised and liaised with damages 
experts, and offered forensic accounting services.177  The court emphasized 
that funding came in only after the issue of liability was already decided, 
when there was only the remote possibility that the House of Lords would 
reverse the decision on appeal,178 and the funder “had no role at all to play” 
in the appeal.179  The court did not find the funder’s other involvement or 
his advice on settlement champertous because the lead attorney had retained 
control of the litigation by using separate counsel for each claimant and a 
reputable, experienced firm of solicitors.180
 
 170. See Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event:  From Champerty to 
Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 n.3 (2011). 
  Similarly, in Arkin v. Borchard 
 171. Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58 (U.K.). 
 172. See id. §§ 13(1), 14(1); Queen ex rel. Factortame v. Sec’y of State for Transp., 
[2002] EWCA (Civ) 932 [31], [2003] Q.B. 381 at 399 (Eng.). 
 173. Factortame, [2002] EWCA (Civ) at [31], [2003] Q.B. at 399.  Indeed, it is just this 
type of “public policy” that prevents officers of the court in the United Kingdom from 
offering contingency fee arrangements. Trendtex Trading v. Credit Suisse, [1980] 1 Q.B. 
629 at 663 (Eng.); Giles v. Thompson, [1993] 3 All E.R. 321 at 332 (Steyn L.J.) (Eng.) 
(“Contingency fee agreements are nowadays perhaps the most important species of 
champerty. Such agreements are still unlawful.”).  Contingency fee agreements are only 
unenforceable, however, when “the provision of litigation or advocacy services [are] 
concluded by those with rights to conduct litigation.” Factorame, [2002] EWCA (Civ) at 
[54], [2003] Q.B. at 405. 
 174. See id. at [79]–[90], [2003] Q.B. at 412–14. 
 175. An example is IM Litigation Funding, which a group of attorneys founded in 2002. 
See 2006 STANDING COMM. SUBMISSION, supra note 164, at 4 (discussing the role of 
litigation funding firms). 
 176. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 932, [2003] Q.B. 381. 
 177. See id. at [28]–[30], [2003] Q.B. at 398–99. 
 178. See id. at [81], [2003] Q.B. at 412. 
 179. Id.; see also id. at [82], [2003] Q.B. at 412 (holding that the agreement was not 
contrary to public policy). 
 180. Id. at [90], [2003] Q.B. at 414. 
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Lines Ltd.,181 the Court of Appeal approved third-party funding, but 
stressed that the claimholder was “the party primarily interested in the result 
of the litigation and the party in control of the conduct of the litigation.”182
So far, U.K. courts have not gone as far as Australian courts in allowing a 
funder to exert control over the management of a case,
 
183 but this may 
change in the near future.  The commercial claim funding industry is not as 
developed in the United Kingdom as it is in Australia, but it is growing fast 
and some predict that litigation is increasing.184  Moreover, contingency 
fees are not allowed in the United Kingdom, so claim funding provides 
access to an otherwise unavailable court system.185  Courts and regulators 
alike view claim funding as a way for more litigants to access justice.186
 
 181. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3055 (Eng.). 
  
Thus, it would not be surprising if the United Kingdom followed 
Australia’s lead. 
 182. Id. at [40], [2005] 1 W.L.R. at 3070. 
 183. See Attrill, supra note 154, at 6 (“English courts are yet to go as far as the High 
Court, particularly on the vexed issue of the degree of control the funder may have over the 
proceedings, but there are unmistakable signs that they are moving towards accepting a 
wider role for funders.”). 
 184. See Mary Jacoby, U.K. Auditions Litigation:  Regulators Urge U.S.-Style Suits 
Against Cartels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at A12 (analyzing claim funding in the United 
Kingdom); see also Martin, supra note 165, at 113 (making the same point that the United 
Kingdom is closing the gap with Australia); Andrew Hill, Ignore the ‘Trends’ and Examine 
the Retail Detail, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at 18. 
 185. See Martin, supra note 165, at 112–13.  In the United Kingdom and Australia, 
plaintiffs cannot engage attorneys on a contingency basis and losing plaintiffs have to pay 
the defendant’s legal expenses. See Waye, supra note 25, at 232. But see U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD PARTY FINANCING:  ETHICAL & LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS IN 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 15 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/
sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/research/thirdpartyfinancingeurope.pdf 
(suggesting that the relationships developed between third-party funders and attorneys 
provide more control to the financier); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning 
Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 757–72 (2002) (examining the returns lawyers 
earn on the time they invest in contingency fee cases).  Although lawyers cannot have a fee 
indexed to the recovery in the United Kingdom, they can be given what is called a 
conditional fee, which is an uplift on the fee that is not tied to the recovery. See Tariq 
Ahmad, European Court of Human Rights/United Kingdom:  Use of Conditional Fee 
Agreements Seen as Violation of European Convention on Human Rights, LIBR. CONGRESS 
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402484_text. 
 186. In the United Kingdom, the structure of the legal profession and the regulatory 
framework are different than in the United States:  there are barristers and solicitors, and 
class actions are not allowed. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market:  The Impact of 
Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 266–67 (2007) (“Class actions remain rare to 
unknown in Europe (including the United Kingdom) . . . .”).  Therefore, these countries view 
claim funding as a way for more litigants to access justice. See 2005 STANDING COMM. 
SUBMISSION, supra note 168, at 10 (noting that “access to justice” was an important 
consideration); Martin, supra note 165, at 106–07; id. at 112–13 (“In the UK, the Civil 
Justice Council, an advisory public body responsible for overseeing the modernization of the 
civil justice system, concluded in April 2007 that litigation funding played an important role 
in facilitating access to justice and that no new regulations of the industry were necessary.”); 
Attrill, supra note 154, at 6. 
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C.  The United States 
Commercial claim funding’s level of acceptance in the United States is 
dramatically behind that of Australia and the United Kingdom.  Although 
claim funding is allowed in some states, its status is still very precarious.  In 
some places, the defenses of champerty, maintenance, and barratry187 
sometimes work to void claim funding arrangements.188  In those states 
where these doctrines still exist, either at common law or by statute, claim 
funding is either prohibited or severely restricted.  In the other states, courts 
have either eliminated these doctrines or failed to adopt them in the first 
place.189  Although some courts recognize that “agreements to purchase an 
interest in an action may actually foster resolution of a dispute,”190 many of 
the courts upholding these agreements do so with little enthusiasm.  Like 
their counterparts that invalidate these agreements, these courts express 
concern that claim funding will instigate litigation of unjustified claims,191
 
 187. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (“[M]aintenance is helping another 
prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the 
outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty.”); ABA White 
Paper, supra note 
 
22, at 10 (“Champerty is considered a type of maintenance.”).  For a 
description and analysis of these doctrines in the claim funding context, see generally 
Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money:  The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 649 (2005). 
 188. See, e.g., MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333–34 (Va. 1998) (citing 
Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).  According to 
at least one scholar, “Assignment of personal injury tort claims is prohibited throughout the 
United States.” Sebok, supra note 16, at 62.  Some courts will distinguish between an 
agreement that assigns the cause of action itself and one that assigns a portion of the 
proceeds, viewing the latter, which is similar to an insurance contract, as an enforceable 
equitable assignment. See id. at 85; see also Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 1991).  Other courts claim that there is no distinction. See, e.g., Karp v. Speizer, 
647 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Town & Country Bank of Springfield v. Country 
Mut. Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 639, 640–41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Sebok, supra note 16, at 121 
(“[T]he common law of the United States embraces free assignability in all choses of action 
except personal injury . . . legal malpractice (except when it does), and fraud (except when it 
does)”).  For a thorough discussion of this aspect of the case law and the history of the 
doctrine, see generally Sebok, supra note 16. 
 189. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 112 (explaining that some state courts have 
held that the English common law prohibitions on champerty were never adopted, while 
others abandoned or struck down the champerty laws that were adopted from England, or 
otherwise made clear that they would enforce claim funding agreements to some degree).  
According to research conducted by Anthony Sebok, twenty-eight jurisdictions specifically 
allow champerty, with some limitations. Sebok, supra note 16, at 98–99 & n.162; see also 
Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work:  An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1297, 1333–41 (2002).  According to the ABA, there may be even more jurisdictions that 
tolerate champerty to some degree, “[g]iven the somewhat ancient status of the decisions” 
which prohibit the practice. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 12. 
 190. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226–27 (Mass. 1997) (quoting McInerney 
v. Massasoit Greyhound Ass’n, 269 N.E.2d 211, 217 (Mass. 1971)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 191. Sebok, supra note 16, at 126 (explaining that although “[t]here is no common law 
prohibition of maintenance (or champerty) in New York,” “New York’s law of assignment 
and maintenance is concerned almost exclusively with contracts made before the lawsuit is 
filed” to prevent instigating litigation). 
2824 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
interfere in the attorney-client relationship and the independence of the 
lawyer,192 and disenfranchise plaintiffs.193
In some of those states that have abolished champerty, maintenance, and 
barratry, courts may still invalidate agreements with third-party funders as 
unconscionable
 
194 or against public policy.  These courts refuse to uphold 
claim funding agreements if the third party is an “officious intermeddler,” 
i.e., attempting to influence trial strategy or settlement.195  For example, 
Florida defines officious intermeddling as “‘offering unnecessary and 
unwanted advice or services . . . esp[ecially] in a highhanded or overbearing 
way.’”196  Thus, intermeddling can be found even if the claimholder retains 
the power to select his or her attorney, settle, or abandon the suit,197 and 
select the theory and strategy for the case.198
 
 192. There are many opinions from bar committees around the country emphasizing this 
issue, which encompasses the effect a third-party funding agreement has on a litigant’s 
settlement power, the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, and the sanctity of 
the lawyer-client relationship in general. See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct, Op. 01-07 (Sept. 2001) (permitting a lawyer to set up a line of credit with a 
third-party lender to advance a client’s costs provided that “representation of the client will 
not be ‘materially limited’ by the lawyer’s responsibilities to the lender”); Fla. Bar Prof’l 
Ethics Comm., Op. 00-3 (Mar. 15, 2002) (allowing that attorney to recommend a client to a 
funder in limited circumstances, provided that the attorney does “not allow the funding 
company to direct the litigation, interfere with the attorney-client relationship, or otherwise 
influence the attorney’s independent professional judgment”); N.J. Advisory Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 691 (Jan. 2001) (“Counsel must refrain from any relationship with or 
responsibilities to the [funder] which could in any way impair his or her duty of undivided 
fidelity to the client.”); see also Sebok, supra note 
 
16, at 135 (same); ABA White Paper, 
supra note 22, at 17–22.  For a discussion of these issues, see infra Part IV. 
 193. See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (remarking, in upholding the agreement, that “the Attorney 
General seems to have given these types of funding institutions his blessing”); Martin, supra 
note 165, at 109 (“Nevertheless, there has also been a longstanding fear in the United States 
that litigation financing would strip plaintiffs of their power to control their litigation and 
would interfere with the relationship between attorney and client.”); Sebok, supra note 16, at 
69–70 (citing MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1998)). 
 194. See, e.g., Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005) (intimating that it might not uphold future agreements where interest rates “are higher 
than the risks associated with the transaction” and commenting that “a company that only 
loaned money when it was secured by high-grade personal injury claims would seem to be 
able to charge a lower interest rate than some of the rates described in this opinion, even 
when the arrangement is a nonrecourse loan”). 
 195. It appears that in many of the states where prohibitions against champerty still exist, 
the test is whether there is “officious intermeddling,” which includes offering advice in the 
conduct of the litigation, determining trial strategy, or controlling settlement. See Kraft v. 
Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Isaac Marcushamer, Note, Selling 
Your Torts:  Creating a Market for Tort Claims and Liability, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1543, 
1551 n.34 (2005) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35); see also ABA 
White Paper, supra note 22, at 12. 
 196. Kraft, 668 So. 2d at 682 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 988 (2d 
college ed. 1986)). But see Sebok, supra note 16, at 116 (arguing that giving advice is too 
low a standard and that intermeddling should mean that the funder has acquired the 
claimholder’s right to make certain decisions regarding the litigation). 
 197. See Am. Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56 F.R.D. 26, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 198. See Sebok, supra note 16, at 111–12; see also id. at 109–10 & n.196 (explaining 
how a funder might legally contract to get practical control over settlement or control the 
theory of the case and describing terms of a contract illustrating different types of demands a 
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Even when courts uphold claim funding agreements, they make clear that 
they might not do so in the future if the agreements establish a relationship 
with the funder that is anything more than passive, or if the contract was 
with the lawyer.  They suggest that agreements that permit investors to take 
anything more than a passive role in the case—choose the attorney, select 
trial strategy, participate in settlement talks, or receive payment directly 
from the lawyers—would violate public policy.199  The ABA has taken the 
same position, contending that an agreement that prevents a plaintiff from 
changing attorneys without consent of the funder would violate public 
policy.200  Indeed, some states have enacted legislation requiring that claim 
funding contracts specifically deny funders the right to make any decisions 
regarding the claim or settlement of it.201  Thus, if the agreement grants the 
funder any type of active role, the courts may void it as against public 
policy.202
As with lawyers involvement with nonlawyers generally, another driving 
concern in this context is that claim funding will cause lawyers to violate 
the Model Rules governing lawyers’ independent professional judgment,
 
203
 
third-party funder might make).  Other states, including Colorado, do not show much 
concern over control issues. See, e.g., Bashor v. Northland Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 864, 867 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (holding a contract lawful regardless of whether or not the 
claimholder retains the power to select its attorney, and finding the argument for its illegality 
“a little paradoxical coming from defendant who is operating under a similar contract, i.e., 
the insurance policy”); Sebok, supra note 
 
16, at 113 (interpreting this case as taking the 
position that “if the suit brought is meritorious—meaning that the plaintiff wanted to bring it, 
but was wanting of resources—then the degree of control exercised by the funder is 
irrelevant”). 
 199. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 200. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 22; see also id. at 25 (“Even in states 
permitting an ALF supplier to obtain an interest in a party’s cause of action, retention by the 
supplier of control over the decision-making of the party and its counsel, via a contractual 
provision between the supplier and the party, may be deemed unlawful as champerty or 
maintenance.”). 
 201. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); 
Richmond, supra note 187, at 682 (“[T]he funding company should agree that it will neither 
attempt to direct nor regulate the attorney’s judgment in the case being funded.”); cf. Martin, 
supra note 165, at 109 (“[I]n the United States, litigation funders merely advance money to 
plaintiffs to use any way they wish; they do not directly fund the litigation at all, a role that 
is, however, permitted for U.S. attorneys.”); ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 26 
(explaining that “some ALF suppliers disclaim any control over the decision-making of 
lawyers, stating that they are in an entirely passive role,” and some courts note that “the ALF 
supplier exercised no control over the lawyer’s representation of the client.”). 
 202. It is not clear, however, how passive a role a funder will play even if the agreement 
is silent on the issue.  The funder wields considerable power as keeper of the checkbook and 
with that power has de facto, if not de jure, influence. See infra note 220.  In one Florida 
case, in which the funder had the contractual rights to approve filing issues, control attorney 
selection, review attorney bills, find expert witnesses, and veto any settlement agreements, 
the court treated the funder as a “party” with respect to a fee-splitting statute. See Abu-
Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693–94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 203. Model Rule 2.1 requires lawyers to exercise objective independent judgment. See 
ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 23–26; cf. Richmond, supra note 187, at 651–52 
(contending that litigation funding is ethical but that “[c]ritics of the practice are concerned 
that litigation financiers will potentially manipulate the parties to whom they make loans or 
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conflicts of interest,204 fee splitting,205 and confidentiality.206  Even when 
the contract is between the funder and the client, the ABA predicts that 
problems will arise about “who actually owns the claim, who controls the 
lawsuit, the role (if any) of the [funder] participating in significant decision-
making during the litigation, and how to resolve conflicts between the 
client’s directive, the [funder]’s financial expectations, and the lawyer’s 
assessment of the client’s best interests.”207  Essentially, the ABA fears that 
even lawful agreements between the funder and the client (whether a 
corporation or consumer) could interfere with the ability of the attorney to 
render independent judgment.208
There is the potential for a large claim funding market in the United 
States.  In 2005, publicly listed U.S. companies reported approximately $52 
billion of exposure to contingent obligations,
 
209 and this number may be 
understated given that it excludes claims that could not be monetized and 
claims by companies as plaintiffs.210  Some have estimated that litigation 
funding could be a billion dollar business in the United States.211  Indeed, 
outsiders have been investing in claims in the United States for about 
twenty years.212  Outsider funding has been used in the consumer context to 
fund many large, well-known cases, such as the Vioxx litigation and some 
asbestos cases.213
 
will act in ways that impair the professional judgment of the attorneys to whom they advance 
expenses”). 
  It has also been used in the commercial context within 
 204. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 17–22 (identifying the conflicts of interest 
issues); see also Oliver v. Bd. of Governors, 779 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“[A]n 
attorney’s primary loyalty will, as a practical matter, rest with the person or entity who pays 
him.”). 
 205. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 31. 
 206. See id. at 23 (explaining that lawyers should be careful to warn clients that the 
attorney-client privilege may be waived if confidential information is disclosed to third-party 
funders); see also supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 25–26. 
 208. Id. at 28 (making this claim as it relates to requirements for consent of the ALF to 
settle). 
 209. SEC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET 
IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 71 
(June 15, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf. 
 210. See id. at 72 & n.175. 
 211. See New York City Bar Gives Thumbs Up to Litigation-Funding, THOMSON REUTERS 
NEWS & INSIGHT (June 20, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/
2011/06_-_June/New_York_City_Bar_gives_thumbs_up_to_litigation-funding/ [hereinafter 
NYC Bar] (“The practice of seeking funding for cases from outside investors has been on the 
rise for 20 years, the [New York City Bar] [A]ssociation said.  It has moved from a cottage 
industry of personal-injury cases to a $1 billion business involving a wide swath of 
commercial litigation.”). 
 212. See, e.g., Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (describing 
how the plaintiffs were “[u]nable to personally finance their lawsuit” and thus “syndicated it 
by creating 50 ‘units’ for sale at $10,000 per unit with a 2-unit minimum per investor”); 
Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits:  Illegal Champerty or New Business 
Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 498 (1992). 
 213. See Martin, supra note 165, at 84 n.4 (“Nevertheless, it is fairly well known that 
many large lawsuits, such as the vitamins anti-trust suit, the asbestos cases and the Vioxx 
cases, have been supported by litigation financing companies which are funded by banks, 
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the United States.214  Currently, commercial claim funding is offered to 
plaintiffs and defendants by hedge funds, commercial banks,215 investment 
banks,216 and specialty companies dedicated to the claim funding industry, 
including Juridica, Burford, BlackRobe Capital, Fullbrook Capital, and IMF 
(United States).217
Thus, the commercial claim funding train has left the station.  It is 
broadly allowed in Australia and the United Kingdom (among other 
countries
 
218), and it is occurring within the United States as well, as even 
the ABA has recognized.219  Yet the U.S. legal profession only wants to 
allow claim funding if the third-party funder has absolutely no influence 
over the litigation, case management, or settlement decisions.  Although 
protecting lawyers’ independent judgment is important, and contracts can 
certainly be written to literally meet that expectation, barring the funder 
from having any influence is incompatible with claim funding in 
practice.220
 
private equity and hedge funds.”); Alison Frankel, The Loan Arrangers, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 
2005, at 74 (available on LexisNexis in “The American Lawyer” database).  
 
 214. See generally Frankel, supra note 213; NYC Bar, supra note 211.  Commercial claim 
funders helped finance the recent Ecuadorian case against Chevron. See Patrick Radden 
Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2012, at 38, 43 (noting that Burford 
Capital invested millions of dollars in the case). 
 215. Credit Suisse owns PeachTree Financial Solutions, which “purchase[s] assets 
including structured legal settlements, annuities, lottery winnings, sports contracts and life 
insurance policies.” See About Us, PEACHTREE FIN. SOLUTIONS, http://peachtreefinancial.
com/company/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 216. See Michael G. Blum, Financial Management in a Contingent Fee Practice, 
FINDLAW (Feb. 2, 2012), http://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/financial-
management-in-a-contingent-fee-practice.html. 
 217. In the consumer personal injury plaintiff context, there are many players and the 
amounts advanced are small. See Martin, supra note 165, at 107.  In the commercial context, 
the amounts appear to be much bigger. See, e.g., Burford Capital Profits Up 965%, 
STOCKMARKETWIRE (Apr. 4, 2012, 09:02 AM), http://www.stockmarketwire.com/
article/4343538/Burford-Capital-profits-up-965pct.html (reporting that Burford expected net 
profits of $32 million after nine of its investments either concluded entirely or completed 
trial in 2011).  Insurance companies may also participate in the industry.  For example, if a 
claim financier agrees to provide $3 million to a claimholder, the claim financier might work 
with a broker to buy insurance against losing its principal, which might cost it 10 to 15 
percent of the original investment.  The insurance agency and broker could share the 
proceeds of the policy in some fashion. 
 218. Claim funding is also allowed in Switzerland and Germany. See Andreas 
Frischknecht & Vera Schmidt, Privilege and Confidentiality in Third Party Funder Due 
Diligence:  The Positions in the United States and Switzerland and the Resulting 
Expectations Gap in International Arbitration, TDM (SPECIAL ISSUE), Oct. 2011, at 1, 16, 
available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/search/get_page.asp?v2=
download&v1=tv8%2D4%2Darticle04%2Epdf. 
 219. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 41. (“The market for alternative litigation 
finance involves suppliers and customers who demand this form of financing.  Because of 
this demand, and because of the complexity of regulation in various states, the specific form 
of ALF transactions will undoubtedly continue to evolve.”). 
 220. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 24.  Although some third-party funders 
claim that they do not have, or desire to have, any influence or control over case 
management and that they play an entirely passive role, see id. at 26, and although some 
courts accept that this is the case, see, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l Inc. v. Haskell, 193 
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This stance on claim funding is representative of the profession’s stance 
on nonlawyer influence in general.  Both are shortsighted.  There are 
significant disadvantages to not embracing outside influence—for example, 
commercial claim funding—and there are potential benefits to broadening 
acceptance of both. 
IV.  CLAIM FUNDING AND INFLUENCE ON LAWYERS BY NONLAWYERS:  
A RECIPE FOR STONE SOUP 
Given that open environments enhance innovation, efficiency, and 
problem solving, the legal profession should seek ways to open itself up to 
the opinions and consultation of professionals in other disciplines.  
Commercial claim funding is but one example of the legal profession’s 
refusal to embrace outside collaboration with nonlawyers.  Permitting 
commercial claim funding is one way to accrue the benefits of an open 
environment, which might outweigh the risks to a lawyer’s independent 
judgment so long as they are managed properly and the funding agreement 
is between the funder and the claim holder—the type of agreement on 
which this Article focuses.  Refusing to embrace outside influence, both 
generally and through commercial claim funding specifically, is not only 
misguided, but also untenable because it puts U.S. lawyers at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis global competition. 
This Article assumes that law is in many ways a business, and that 
alternative claim funding will become more accepted in the U.S. 
commercial context, where the claimholder’s and funder’s bargaining 
powers and savvy are in line.221
A.  Commercial Claim Funding:  Potential Benefits 
  The next section contends that claim 
funding’s benefits outweigh the risks, that the risks of outside influence are 
not uncharted or unmanageable, and that refusing to manage the transition 
and further allow claim funding could make the U.S. legal market even 
more isolated and irrelevant. 
With the right structures in place, claim funding can provide benefits to 
lawyers, claimholders, and the legal marketplace generally.  The next 
section shows what type of benefits that outside influence, in the form of 
commercial claim funding, could yield. 
 
S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006), this simply cannot be accurate given the funder’s 
interest in its investment. 
 221. Again, the focus here is on the commercial context and specifically on funding 
agreements between funders and corporations or funders and governmental entities—not 
agreements between funders and law firms. See supra note 150.  Further, a survey of 
commercial claim funders found that most are “only interested in commercial matters 
involving no physical or mental injuries to the claimholder and avoid[] claims which 
otherwise might lead to a divergence in interests between them and the claimholder such as 
family law or defamation matters.” Waye, supra note 25, at 252.  Admittedly, there are 
different concerns with claim funding in the consumer sector, for example, around the 
equality of bargaining power.  These concerns, however, are not present in the commercial 
context. 
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1.  Specific Benefits 
Much has been written on the agency costs that exist between clients 
(principals) and their lawyers (agents).222  Although many of these costs do 
not apply as fully in the commercial context, where clients are often 
sophisticated repeat players with seasoned in-house counsel223 and greater 
bargaining power,224 commercial claim funders have the potential to reduce 
some of the costs that remain.225  Because lawyers are not necessarily 
experts in finance, third-party funders are better able to help claimholders 
understand the value of their claim226 and the appropriate costs to spend 
pursuing the claim.227  Specifically, claim funders can help determine the 
level of resources to devote to a case, establish optimal settlement ranges 
based on econometric principles and data, and provide a second opinion on 
case prospects.  The funder can also help the lawyer and claimholder build 
economic arguments to be used in settlement negotiations.228
Furthermore, claim funders can provide continuous monitoring of the 
attorneys to ensure that deadlines and performance standards are met and 
that hourly billing or other fee arrangements are appropriate.  Even passive 
third-party funders attempt to have some influence over how much lawyers 
are paid for their work.
 
229  But regardless of the level of control that they 
exercise, claim funders have a special expertise in project management and 
lack a personal relationship with the law firm.230
 
 222. See, e.g., Waye, supra note 
  A third-party claim 
funder’s interest overlaps with the claimholder’s interest because both are 
25, at 228–32; Wilkins, supra note 123, at 824–30. 
 223. Coates et al., supra note 73, at 1000 (discussing how the asymmetry of information 
has decreased, although it still exists, because of the rise of general counsel within large 
corporations). 
 224. See Waye, supra note 25, at 255 (explaining that funders and “commercially 
sophisticated” clients “have relatively equal bargaining power”); cf. id. at 231–32 
(explaining that insurers and the government fall into this category). 
 225. See Max Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party Financing Change 
the Face of American Tort Litigation?  The Role of Agency Costs in the Attorney-Client 
Relationship (Sept. 14, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.
northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Schanzenbach_Agency%20Costs.pdf (arguing that 
agency problems in the lawyer-client relationship may be mitigated with third-party 
financing by aligning incentives between the attorney and the client and providing a better 
understanding of the value of the claim to all parties). But see Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is 
This Anyway?:  Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1338 (2011) 
(arguing that the potential benefits of third-party funding will increase agency problems, but 
ultimately concluding that, with careful management, “litigation finance is an industry 
whose time has come”). 
 226. See Waye, supra note 25, at 248 (“One of the most significant benefits of litigation 
funding is the commercial objectivity funders bring to claim evaluation.”) 
 227. See id. at 251. 
 228. See id. at 238. 
 229. See id. at 241 (intimating that funders employ “cost management techniques,” 
including “tender procedures,” “budgetary capping,” and “approval procedures for non-
budgeted services and expenses and flat fees for certain tasks”). 
 230. Cf. Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1276 (arguing that, in general, funders “provide 
monitoring services”). 
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concerned with maximizing the value of the claim.231  Therefore, the funder 
plays the role of watchdog and actively monitors this discrepancy between 
lawyer and client to minimize the amount of shirking.232  For this reason, 
funders promote efficiency, which in turn assists the client.233
In-house counsel are increasingly seeking ways to decrease costs of 
outside legal counsel through alternative fee arrangements, and claim 
funders only increase the potential of finding new arrangements because 
third-party funding is essentially a type of alternative fee arrangement.
 
234
Finally, the presence of a third-party funder signals to the opposing party 
that the claim is worth investing in, which means that some group of 
investors subjected it to due diligence and think it is likely to be 
meritorious.  Although the Chamber of Commerce and other opponents 
often argue that outside investment in claims will increase unmeritorious 
claims and derail settlement,
  
Third-party investors force law firms to change the way they bill and to 
decrease, better manage, and cap their rates.  When a third-party investor 
arranges or provides for funding, the funder can negotiate more precise, 
market-oriented costs.  Even semi-active funders will stay involved to 
ensure that lawyers stay within those budgets.  In-house counsel likely do 
not enjoy dealing with outside counsel on billing issues or fees, so third-
party funders can play that role for the in-house counsel, since they can (and 
want to) make sure that lawyers follow the set spending protocols and bill 
on time in a transparent manner. 
235
In sum, the specific benefits that third parties potentially add to legal case 
management are:  (1) an increased understanding of the value of the claim; 
(2) optimized settlement levels; (3) financial monitoring that decreases 
shirking and increases efficiency; (4) better alignment between out-of-
pocket expenditures and the value of the claim; (5) innovation in billing 
structure; and (6) increased transparency on all financial aspects of claim 
management. 
 the signaling function suggests that it may 
actually make settlement more likely in many cases. 
 
 231. See Waye, supra note 25, at 229 (“[I]n the lawyer-client relationship it is assumed 
that the rational self-interested client’s preference will be to maximize claim value whereas 
the rational self-interested lawyer’s interest will be to maximize fees and to minimize 
effort.”).  This might not be true if the funder finances the suit “to gain a competitive 
advantage over the defendant.” Id. at 244 n.84.  Further, there will be circumstances where 
the claim holder’s and funder’s interests diverge.  For example, the funder may have a 
different time line and attitude toward risk, and the claimholder might have an interest in 
reputation consequences or ongoing relationship with the opposing party.  This highlights 
the need for embedded controls, but as stated, making such recommendations is outside the 
scope of this Article. 
 232. But see Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1322–25 (arguing that the result is a 
“fragmentation of the triangular attorney-client-funder relationship,” which does the 
opposite, in that it reduces the possibility of having “agents-watching-agents”). 
 233. Waye, supra note 25, at 241. 
 234. Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1284 (“Litigation funding represents one such alternative 
modality.  Instead of costly legal bills based on hours worked, clients can shift the costs 
entirely onto investors.”); id. (“[T]his development creates pressure on attorneys’ traditional 
pricing models.”). 
 235. Beisner Letter, supra note 22, at 3–4, 12. 
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2.  General Benefits 
Claim funding also has the potential to redefine the traditional lawyer-
client relationship.  Claim funding involves another party in the 
relationship, and when multiple voices and perspectives mix, problems are 
solved more efficiently and creatively.236  Unlike the ties between lawyers 
and their corporate clients, which could be described as strong, the ties 
between the claimholder and passive funder are weak.  As discussed above, 
even when the ties are weak, innovation, enhanced problem solving, and 
efficiency increase.237
Commercial claim funding enables nonlawyers, nonpracticing lawyers, 
and other types of professionals to have influence in claim management.
 
238  
As explained above, even limited involvement of a third-party funder can 
lower costs, shorten the time for return, and sometimes enhance the actual 
value of the case.239  Furthermore, some commercial funders provide a 
more active, non-subservient form of funding that helps with claim strategy 
and management.240
In addition, the funder may provide law-related advice to the lawyer, 
which may influence the lawyer and actually help the lawyer to provide 
better, more holistic legal advice back to the client.
  Although there are legitimate concerns to heightened 
influence by third-party commercial funders, in this context, the contracting 
parties are of similar or equal bargaining power, and thus neither the 
claimholder nor the funder will have total control.  This enables a 
partnership under which the funder provides advice to the claimholder that, 
in turn, influences how the claimholder interacts with and directs its lawyer.  
Thus, whether the relationship that the lawyer and claimholder have with 
the funder is weaker or stronger, the number of voices has changed along 
with the flow of discourse. 
241  To that end, the 
more active commercial funders offer a range of services, including 
electronic discovery management, legal process, outsourcing, and access to 
outside experts in multidisciplinary fields such as public relations, 
marketing, forensic accounting, or investment strategy.242
 
 236. See supra Part I. 
  While the 
 237. See supra Part I.C (discussing benefits of weak ties). 
 238. Arguably this is more true in the active, as opposed to passive, context. 
 239. See Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress:  Third-Party Funding of American 
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 603 (2010) (describing Juridica and Burford’s 
“painstaking process of case selection”); Jennifer Banzaca, Litigation Funding:  In Turbulent 
Markets, Hedge Fund Managers Turn to Litigation Funding for Absolute, Uncorrelated 
Returns 2–3, HEDGE FUND L. REP. (June 24, 2009), http://www.hflawreport.com (password 
required) (describing funders’ due diligence before investing and their preference for 
lawyers with track records of success); see also Investment Policy, JURIDICA INVS. LTD, 
http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica/investment-policy.aspx (last visited Apr. 
21, 2012). 
 240. Those that play this heightened role act more like venture capitalists with a 
substantial role in business management and less like an ordinary shareholder. 
 241. See supra Part I. 
 242. BlackRobe Capital, for example, states on its website that it “supplies capital and 
works with the claimholder, the claimholder’s lawyers, and professional experts to offer 
extra-legal management expertise and strategic insight in large-scale domestic and 
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lawyer could simply hire outside services without the funder, there are 
some important differences that may provide added benefits. 
First, it is not clear that the lawyer (or client) could afford to hire the 
experts without funding.  Many cases are funded because the law firm and 
the claimholder need additional capital to successfully pursue the claim.  
Hiring additional experts in law-related fields is a luxury that cannot always 
be afforded. 
Second, the service could be offered differently than is currently allowed 
in the United States.243  The funder could offer services that clients claim 
they need and want as part of a multidisciplinary partnership.244  It could 
also provide economies of scale because the experts are often already a part 
of the funder’s company and relationships are already established with 
outsourcers.  Currently, at a large publicly traded corporation, in-house 
counsel must pull together the various service providers needed to manage 
the case.  These general counsels have complained about the failure of the 
law firm to help the corporate client hire the various service providers.245  
The commercial claim funder could fill that gap, acting as the quarterback 
for all the litigation support, legal, and law-related services.246
As discussed, these differences can pose real problems, but they also 
present opportunities.  The value of third-party funding lies in the 
“collisions that happen when different fields of expertise converge in some 
  Further, the 
party recommending or marshaling the expert advice is not the lawyer, but 
the funder, whose interests are aligned (albeit somewhat differently) with 
those of the client. 
 
international litigation and arbitration.” BLACKROBE CAPITAL, http://www.blackrobecapital.
com/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  Fulbrook Capital states on its website that it “offers a 
range of litigation support services, including patent evaluation, electronic discovery 
management and legal outsourcing.” FULBROOK MGMT., http://fulbrookmanagement.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 243. The ABA Commission recommended allowing MDPs, but the ABA House of 
Delegates rejected the recommendation. See Edward J. Cleary, Multidisciplinary Practice:  
One Year Later, BENCH & B. MINN. (Sept. 2000), http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/
2000/sep00/mdp_prof-resp.htm. 
 244. See Daly, supra note 118, at 227–34; Carol A. Needham, Permitting Lawyers to 
Participate in Multidisciplinary Practices:  Business as Usual or the End of the Profession 
as We Know It?, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1327 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs:  
Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 911 (1999) (noting that 
the ABA Commission on MDPs “concluded that there was client demand for MDPs on the 
part of both individual and corporate clients, as well as interest among lawyers in forming 
partnerships with nonlawyers”); Katherine L. Harrison, Comment, Multidisciplinary 
Practices:  Changing the Global View of the Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
879, 915–16 (2000). 
 245. See Daly, supra note 118, at 263, 280 (describing the “client driven demand for one 
stop shopping” behind push for MDPs and noting data confirming the existence of that 
demand). 
 246. See generally Michele D. Beardslee, If Multidisciplinary Partnerships Are 
Introduced into the United States, What Could or Should Be the Role of General Counsel?, 9 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1 (2003) (arguing that general counsels should play this role 
internally for their clients, if and when multidisciplinary partnerships are allowed). 
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shared physical or intellectual space.”247  With the cacophony of voices, 
there is more opportunity for exaptation and tinkering—using parts from 
other disciplines in new areas, or using old parts in new ways.248
These new voices will help drive change, both in the relationships 
between claimholders and their lawyers, and the financial structure of the 
legal marketplace.  Claim funders can provide information to the 
marketplace about claim value and resolution statistics that will enhance 
transparency and likely lead to more and earlier settlements.  Claim funding 
may also drive (and enable) the insurance industry to provide more 
innovative after-the-event policy solutions.  Or it may help general counsel 
manage costs in a more economically rational way.  In either case, 
commercial claim funding represents a form of financial innovation, 
moving a type of investing from non-law fields into law and providing 
alternatives to traditional funding arrangements. 
 
This relationship may, as Johnson points out, create a “messier and more 
chaotic” process, but “it avoids this chronic problem of good ideas being 
hollowed out as they progress through the development chain.”249
B.  Claim Funding:  It Is Not that Alternative 
 
Despite its benefits, commercial claim funding in the United States raises 
the following important questions:  (1) what is at risk if the default 
assumptions are changed to more broadly embrace this practice; and (2) are 
those risks manageable?  As indicated above, the general concerns about 
opening up the legal profession to nonlawyer influence involve threats to 
confidentiality, impairment of the lawyer’s independent judgment, and the 
potential for conflicts of interest.  Although legitimate, all of these concerns 
likely can be mitigated with the right level of regulation and the attorney’s 
competent advising of the client. 
With respect to confidentiality, the main concern is that lawyers might 
share confidential information with third-party funders who will waive the 
protections that the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine 
affords.250  Although both are currently being tested in the commercial 
funding context,251 even the ABA agrees that ensuring that the lawyer 
provides adequate notice and warning about information-sharing can 
minimize the risks associated with potential waiver.252
 
 247. JOHNSON, supra note 
  Putting aside the 
issue of when the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine should 
protect communications with commercial claim funders, waiver of these 
10, at 163.  Obviously, this cannot occur if the funder ends up 
being a single and controlling voice.  This Article assumes that will not be the case in the 
commercial context given the similar bargaining powers of the parties and that funders will 
likely utilize strategic advisors from outside the law to make recommendations on strategy 
and case management. 
 248. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 249. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 171. 
 250. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 32–33. 
 251. See id. at 36–37. 
 252. Id. at 32–38. 
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protections is a familiar and inherent risk of any communication that 
involves a third-party consultant.253
Similarly, the arguments that claim funding agreements may interfere 
with a lawyer’s ability to provide independent legal advice as required 
under Model Rule 5.4(c), or interfere with the lawyer’s duty of loyalty 
creating a conflict of interest, are also familiar ones.  Although these are the 
same “risks” that naysayers have highlighted to prevent multidisciplinary 
practice and outside investment in law firms,
 
254 we have accepted them in 
other contexts, such as in contingency fee and insured-insurer 
arrangements.255
1.  The Contingency Fee Analogy 
  Thus, these risks are neither foreign nor intractable.  
Further, with claim funding’s risks come some specific and unquantifiable 
benefits—some of which neither the contingency fee nor insurance contexts 
offer. 
In some ways, outside investment in claims is very similar to 
contingency fees, which have long been accepted in the United States.256
 
 253. There are strong arguments that both the work-product doctrine and the attorney-
client privilege might apply to communications between third-party funders and claim 
holders when the third-party funder is exerting influence and control over the litigation 
and/or claim management.  For example, in this situation (as opposed to when the funder is 
acting in a more passive role) the third party funder is acting as a consultant and, therefore,  
there is more support for the argument that communications with a third-party funder should 
be protected by the attorney-client privilege because they were necessary for the lawyer to 
provide legal advice to the client about whether to file the claim, proceed with trial, or settle 
the case.     
  
 254. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text. 
 255. Although it is definitely true that both of these contexts are rife with problems, the 
U.S. legal profession has allowed them, perhaps because the risks are worth managing.  To 
that end, other scholars have made these same analogies to support third-party funding of 
legal claims in the United States. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 165, at 109–10 (“The same 
rules that protect defendants from being poorly represented by lawyers paid by insurance 
companies should be able to protect plaintiffs from having litigation funders exert pressure 
on their lawyers.”); Sebok, supra note 16, at 99–100 (considering contingency fees a form of 
maintenance); Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1332–36 (comparing funding agreements to 
insurance contracts); Waye, supra note 25, at 235 (analogizing to insurance contracts); cf. 
Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency:  A Monopoly of Champions or a Market 
for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 668–87 (1995) (comparing the costs and 
benefits of lawyers providing funding via contingency fees to nonlawyers providing 
financing through credit and legal-cost insurance).  The Law Council of Australia has 
recommended that commercial claim funders be “treated the same as insurance carriers” 
with regard to regulation of fees. See Martin, supra note 165, at 111.  Courts outside the 
United States have also made this analogy. See, e.g., Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v 
Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386, 434 (Gummow, Hayne, & Crennan JJ) (Austl.) 
(asserting that funders should be able to influence and exert the same level of control over 
litigation as insurers); Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr [2005] NSWCA 240, ¶¶ 68–71 (Austl.) 
(comparing the funder-claimholder relationship to that of the insured-insurer relationship and 
noting that, in the latter context, absolute control over proceedings was accepted as long as 
there was not harm to the claimholder’s interest).  As a profession, we have also accepted the 
same risks to lawyer independence and conflicts of interest in the context of in-house 
counsel. 
 256. See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the 
Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1970); William 
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In a contingency fee arrangement, lawyers receive a percentage of a 
settlement or judgment instead of being paid up front.257  Contingency fees 
are not considered loans or governed by usury laws because, just like 
commercial claim funders, contingency lawyers “fund” the pursuit of the 
client’s claim and risk losing all the money they have contributed if the 
client does not prevail.258  Both contingency fee lawyers and commercial 
claim funders are repaid by taking a success fee.259  The rates do not vary 
widely.  A typical contingency fee arrangement yields approximately 33 
percent of the recovery to the contingency lawyer, plus costs of 
litigation.260  A funder can receive between 30 and 50 percent of the 
recovery.261
 
R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees—A Level Playing Field?, WIPO MAG., Feb. 2010, at 3, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2010/wipo_pub_121_2010_01.pdf 
(claiming “contingency fee arrangements ha[ve] become widespread” and been around for 
100 years).  The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform rejects this analogy. See Beisner 
Letter, supra note 
 
22, at 3–4. 
 257. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk:  The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270 (1998) (“Thus, the lawyer effectively insures the 
client for the expenses associated with pursuing a claim.  In addition to insuring for the out-
of-pocket expenses, the lawyer also insures the value of his or her time.  If the lawyer 
obtains no recovery for the client, the lawyer absorbs the entire opportunity cost of the time 
expended on the case.”); Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 813, 816 (1989) (“It goes without saying that this is an unusual form of 
‘insurance’ in that the attorney, unlike an insurance company, is not guaranteed a 
premium.”). 
 258. For this reason, some state court decisions have held that claim funding agreements 
are not loans and therefore cannot be considered usurious. See, e.g., Dopp v. Yari, 927 
F. Supp. 814, 824 (D.N.J. 1996); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d. 679, 683–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996); Nyquist v. Nyquist, 841 P.2d 515, 518 (Mont. 1992); Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 98–99 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).  Similarly, the U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform has claimed that the practice of third-party funding “avoids 
prohibitions against usury.” JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER, & GARY RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE:  THIRD PARTY LITIGATION 
FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf 
(“Third-party financing contracts generally resemble non-recourse loans:  if the party 
recovers nothing, it does not have to repay the funding company.”).  Other state courts, 
however, have characterized funds from claim investors to be loans that trigger usury rules 
and limitations, at least in the consumer context. See, e.g., Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. 
Suthers, No. 10CV8380, slip op. at 6 (Colo. Denver Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press_releases/2011/09/29/oasis_
order.pdf (holding that “the transactions” between the funder and claim holder “create debt 
under the plain language of the UCCC” and “are ‘loans’ governed by the UCCC”); Lawsuit 
Fin., LLC v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 238–40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
 259. See Jay, supra note 257, at 814 (“All [contingent fees] share the basic feature that 
the lawyer receives a fee for services only if there is a monetary recovery by the client.  The 
fee is commonly based on a percentage of the recovery by the plaintiff, which could be the 
gross amount or a net amount recovered after litigation expenses are deducted.  
Alternatively, contingent fees can be hourly in nature, meaning that the lawyer bills for the 
total hours spent on the case only if the representation has been successful.”); Waye, supra 
note 25, at 262 (“[T]he funder is usually entitled to a portion of the representative plaintiff’s 
damages as a success fee.  The success fee represents the profit due to the funder for 
accepting litigation risk.”). 
 260. Kritzer, supra note 257, at 285 (explaining that it is about one-third); cf. Lester 
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies:  Hamlet Without the Prince of 
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There are a few important differences between claim funding and 
contingency fees.  First, the contingency agreement is always offered at the 
beginning—the claim cannot get off the ground without it.  This—along 
with the fact that in America,262 each side generally pays its own legal 
fees—is one of the major factors opponents use to argue that contingency 
fees lead to baseless lawsuits that would not be brought otherwise.263  
Claim funding, on the other hand, usually comes in after a claim has been 
brought.264  It is therefore curious why there are accusations that claim 
funding violates laws against champerty but contingency fee arrangements 
do not.265
Second, because defendants find contingency fees less appealing, 
plaintiffs utilize them more often.
 
266
 
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 30 (1989) (arguing against the “unassailability of the 
standard one-third rate”). 
  Claim funding, however, appeals to 
 261. Waye, supra note 25, at 253 (“While success fees of between 30–50% may appear, 
from an outsider’s perspective, to be profit gouging on the part of funders, sophisticated 
commercial operators are prepared to share their business risk at this price.”).  The typical 
fee of IMF, is “thirty percent of the net proceeds of the case plus reimbursement of its costs” 
and “IMF’s average case lasts just more than three years.” Martin, supra note 165, at 107.  
Further, between 2002 and 2006, its return on capital of about A$30 million has yielded A$8 
million in earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), or about a 7 percent per annum return 
on capital. Id. at 108.  In Australia during the same period, the major liability insurance 
carriers had a return on capital of between 15 and 22 percent. Id. at 108.  In the United 
Kingdom, IM Litigation Funding generally receives between 25 and 50 percent of the 
proceeds of the case after expenses are reimbursed. Id. at 113. 
 262. Beisner Letter, supra note 22, at 3 (“In most other legal systems, the losing party 
must pay the opposing party’s attorneys’ fees and costs.  Often referred to as the ‘English 
Rule,’ this approach discourages the filing of questionable claims because the losing litigant 
can be stuck with a hefty bill.”); see also David P. Riesenberg, Note, Fee Shifting in 
Investor-State Arbitration:  Doctrine and Policy Justifying Application of the English Rule, 
60 DUKE L.J. 977, 979–80 (2011). 
 263. Beisner Letter, supra note 22, at 3. 
 264. Claim funding often comes in after a plaintiff has already begun the suit, at a point 
where he, without more funds, will have to walk away from pursuing a claim that was 
already in progress. See, e.g., supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text.  In fact, some 
jurisdictions only allow third-party funding that comes in after a lawsuit is filed. See Sebok, 
supra note 16, at 74 n.53. 
 265. According to the ABA, 
these doctrines evolved to take account of the development of contingent-fee 
financing, the provision of state rules of professional conduct preserved the 
distinction between prohibited assistance or acquisition of an interest in the client’s 
cause of action, on the one hand, and permitted contingent-fee financing on the 
other.  In substance, however, the permitted and prohibited transactions are 
similar—a non-party provides financial assistance to a party, or acquires an 
interest in the party’s cause of action. 
ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 22.  Opponents to contingency fee arrangements also 
claim that they stir up litigation. See Jay, supra note 257, at 816 (explaining that critics 
contend that contingency fees “encourage[] unnecessary litigation”). 
 266. Towns, supra note 256, at 5 (“Some studies suggest defendants are unlikely to 
choose contingency fee arrangements over fixed fee or hourly billing arrangements, because 
they view litigation as a purely negative gamble.”); cf. Jay, supra note 257, at 814 (citing 
studies showing many plaintiffs could not bring their suits without contingency fee 
arrangements).  Although generally contingency fee arrangements are offered to plaintiffs, 
some law firms offer partial contingency fee arrangements to defendants.  For example, 
according to its website, Kirkland & Ellis states that “[d]efense cases can also be structured 
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both plaintiffs and defendants.267  Because they would assume some of the 
risk, claim funders can offer corporate defendants cost certainty regarding 
their future defense expenses, which would relieve the financial pressure to 
capitulate to plaintiffs’ settlement demands.268
Finally, in addition to offering the safety and predictability of a 
contingency fee arrangement, commercial claim funding contracts offer 
greater benefits to corporate clients because they are made between the 
client and the funder, not the lawyer.
 
269  For example, claim funding offers 
the ability to project the value of a claim asset on a company’s books prior 
to actual recovery270 and to pursue smaller or non-core claims that, without 
this arrangement, would be unaffordable.  Whereas in a contingency fee 
arrangement, the interests of the lawyer and the client may at times be 
misaligned and create conflicts of interest in the lawyer-client 
relationship,271 contracting with the claimholder directly means that there is 
a lower risk of infringing on the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer’s 
independent judgment, and the rules about fee splitting.272  Claim funders 
can also advance funding to help a corporate client continue to operate 
while awaiting a potentially enormous recovery that would make the client 
more than whole again, something that the Model Rules prohibit lawyers 
from doing.273
 
as partial contingency fees with success contingent on agreed upon results or milestones 
being achieved.” Alternative Fee Arrangements, KIRKLAND & ELLIS , 
http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=341 (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
  Further, only certain attorneys are willing to work on a 
 267. That said, funding defendants is not likely to be as enticing to funders because the 
recovery is generally lower. 
 268. Holly E. Loiseau et al., Third-Party Financing of Commercial Litigation, 24 IN-
HOUSE LITIGATOR, Summer 2010, at 1.  Commercial claim funders can insure their 
investments, thereby limiting this risk. See supra note 217. 
 269. This is not always the case and sometimes the agreements are between the attorney 
and funder.  Although it has been done in the United States, the issues around lawyer 
independence and conflicts of interest are exacerbated, albeit surmountable. Cf. Richmond, 
supra note 187, at 652 (arguing that litigation funding is ethical and that agreements can be 
made between the attorney and the funder). 
 270. See also Martin, supra note 165, at 112 (“The financing of lawsuits by third parties 
also serves as a risk management tool for companies that are willing to give up a share of the 
proceeds of the litigation in exchange for reducing the downside litigation risks and for 
getting some of the potential returns up front.”).  It also offers the ability to provide off-
balance sheet financing for claim defenses. 
 271. See Jay, supra note 257, at 816 (discussing the potential possibilities for abuse, such 
as overcharging and lack of time commitment by the attorney because the lawyer has a 
certain financial stake in the outcome). 
 272. See Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1292 (noting that agreements between claimholders 
and funders skirt around fee-splitting prohibitions).  According to opponents, however, there 
still may be a conflicts of interest problem. See, e.g., ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 17 
(identifying the conflicts of interest issues, including that “[a]n agreement between an ALF 
supplier and a client, permitting the ALF supplier to have veto power over the selection of 
counsel, may limit the client’s right to terminate counsel in a manner that is inconsistent with 
Model Rule 1.16(a)”). 
 273. See Richmond, supra note 187, at 649–50. 
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contingency basis, whereas an outside claim funder affords the claimholder 
the comfort of hiring one of their preferred providers.274
Lastly, the fact that the funding is provided by a third party is a reason 
why it should be embraced.  The third party is a nonlawyer—an additional 
professional that can add value to the litigation process and the claim.
 
275
Commercial claim funding has many of the positives that contingency 
fee arrangements offer, and some of the risks associated with contingency 
fee arrangements are reduced.
 
276
2.  The Insurance Analogy 
  Furthermore, the differences that do exist 
potentially yield extra benefits with alternative commercial claim funding 
that do not exist in the contingency fee context. 
When the claim funding agreements are between the claimholder and the 
funder, several aspects of this relationship are analogous to that between a 
typical insurer and an insured.277
First, similar issues concerning conflicts of interest and independence of 
the lawyer exist in the relationship between a typical insurer and an insured.  
As Maya Steinitz points out, when the insurer pays the insured’s attorney, 
“doors open to conflicts of interest between insurer and insured, and 
between insurer and attorney.”
 
278  The funder has a relationship with the 
claimholder much like the insurer’s relationship with the insured, and as in 
the insurance context, if a conflict arises between the two, the lawyer’s 
primary duty of loyalty lies with the client.279  Claim funding actually 
avoids the problematic aspect of the insured-insurer relationship that arises 
when the insurer is also the attorney’s client,280
 
 274. Coates et al., supra note 
 because the lawyer’s duty 
73, at 1012–15 (finding that chief legal officers “place 
primary weight on relationship factors when hiring outside counsel for important matters” 
and that selection is “almost always determined” by prior personal experience working with 
the lawyer or team of lawyers); id. at 1009 (“By 2003, more than 60 percent of our survey 
respondents allocated 80+ percent of their outside spend on fewer than 25 law firms, and 39 
percent allocated 80+ percent to fewer than 10 law firms.”).  Many law firms cannot offer 
the same amount of funding or the same deal as a commercial claim funder.  It is not 
uncommon for a commercial claim funder to come into the case after the law firm has over-
extended its funding capacity. 
 275. See Sebok, supra note 16, at 100 (pointing out that courts struggle with “the degree 
to which, non-lawyer third parties may support meritorious litigation to which they are not a 
party”). See generally Part I. 
 276. Of course, there may be other negatives that come with commercial claim funding 
that do not come with contingency arrangements. 
 277. There is much debate over whether an analogy can be made between the insurer-
insured relationship and funder-funded relationship, but others have made a similar analogy. 
See, e.g., Beisner Letter, supra note 22, at 23–24; Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1332–33; 
Waye, supra note 25, at 235. 
 278. Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1296. 
 279. Id. at 1333 (“[T]he insurer’s responsibility for the defense also affords it the right to 
control the litigation, though insurer’s [sic] generally permit private counsel of the insured to 
advise and often employ outside counsel with obligations to the client.”); Waye, supra note 
25, at 235. 
 280. Waye, supra note 25, at 235; see also Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1334 (“In certain 
relatively limited circumstances, insurance law imposes on the insurer a duty to hire 
independent counsel for the insured.”). 
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must still lie with the insured if there is a conflict.281  In contrast, if the 
claim funder does not retain the lawyer, the funder is not a client within the 
Model Rules’ definition, and thus escapes some of the conflicts issues that 
plague the insurance structure.282
Second, the two arrangements are comparable with respect to the degree 
of control and influence the insurer or claim funder exercises.  In the 
insured-insurer relationship, the insured often must agree to delegate a great 
deal of control over claim resolution strategies and choice of lawyer to the 
insurer in exchange for coverage, and the insurer can settle on any terms if 
the insured has given informed consent and has delegated the authority.
 
283  
These are not considered violations of Model Rule 5.4(c).284
Third, as in the insured-insurer relationship, in the commercial context, 
the funder is not actually acting for the claim holder’s benefit but instead in 
its own self-interest.
  In the 
commercial claim funding context, on the other hand, the claimholder still 
uses its choice of counsel and has more leverage at the outset to negotiate to 
either maintain or delegate decision-making power without forfeiting the 
funding—that is, claimholders can still get the funding if they maintain 
control, although the amount or the level of recovery offered to the funder 
may differ depending on the level of control ceded. 
285  Both parties, which are sophisticated and have 
legal representation, understand this.286
 
 281. Waye, supra note 
  As such, insurers are not 
25, at 235.  That said, the law recognizes that this is not always 
how insurer-paid attorneys behave and it has developed rules and remedies in response—not 
unlike what is recommended here. 
 282. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 17 (2009) (“Most of the duties flowing 
from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to 
render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.”); cf. id. R. 1.7 cmt. 13 (“A lawyer 
may be paid from a source other than the client . . . .”); see also Waye, supra note 25, at 234 
(making the same point in the context of the Australian model rules and case law). 
 283. Waye, supra note 25, at 246 (making a similar point in the context of Australian 
law); see also Martin, supra note 165, at 109–10 (“On the other side of a lawsuit it is well-
accepted that insurance companies are going to assume control of the litigation for their 
defendants/insureds.  The same rules that protect defendants from being poorly represented 
by lawyers paid by insurance companies should be able to protect plaintiffs from having 
litigation funders exert pressure on their lawyers.  In the United States, loyalty is an essential 
element of lawyers’ responsibilities to their clients.”); Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1333 
(explaining that in addition to having the “right to control the litigation,” “[t]he insurer may 
also negotiate and control settlement”). 
 284. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt.1–2; id. R. 1.8(f) (allowing the 
attorney to accept payment from a third-party with client’s informed consent and if it will 
not interfere with the attorney’s independent judgment). 
 285. This is why many court decisions hold that the common interest doctrine does not 
apply to the relationship between alternative claim funders and the claimholder. See, e.g., 
Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del. 2010) (“[F]or a 
communication to be protected, the interests must be ‘identical, not similar, and be legal, not 
solely commercial.’” (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996))).  This is far from clear, however. See ABA White Paper, supra note 22, at 26.  
Some scholars claim that the common interest applies in this context. See, e.g., Richmond, 
supra note 187, at 675–76. 
 286. Even if the claim is managed by a general counsel of a large corporation, the 
corporate claimholder arguably should have separate legal counsel to advise them on the 
case.  This lawyer would, under Model Rule 1.4, be in charge of advising the client corporate 
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considered fiduciaries of the insured,287 nor are commercial claim funders 
considered fiduciaries of commercial claimholders.288  Instead, they work 
in collaboration and take into account each other’s interests and 
objectives.289
Fourth, although there is no fiduciary duty, there are doctrines of law that 
regulate the relationship for the protection of the client.  For instance, there 
might be certain situations wherein the claimholder might reasonably 
expect the funder to act in its interest (with respect to confidentiality, for 
example, although this should be spelled out in a contract between 
sophisticated parties)
 
290 and which may give rise to an implied duty of good 
faith.291
While it is true that there is a well-established legal structure dealing with 
insurer-insured relationships, but none for claim funding, the point of this 
Article is that the risks posed by commercial claim funding are neither new 
nor unmanageable.  Therefore, the U.S. legal profession should not use 
these risks to continue to prohibit claim funding in this context. 
  For example, because state insurance law imposes a duty on the 
insurer to act in good faith in approving settlements, it is required to do so 
with due regard to the insured’s interests.  A similar duty could be implied 
when the client claimholder agrees to allow the funder to approve the 
settlement and the client claimholder communicates those decisions to the 
lawyer as though they were the client’s own.  If the client claimholder 
delegates control to the funder, there might be some kind of implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing on the part of the funder, which would mitigate 
the conflict of interest for the lawyer. 
3.  Summary and a Caveat 
Commercial claim funding challenges the traditional model of the 
lawyer-client relationship.  There are legitimate concerns over the level of 
influence that a funder might have over a claimholder and the lawyer, but 
these risks are mitigated in the commercial context, wherein the funder 
 
claimholder on the benefits and risks to such a deal. See, e.g., ABA White Paper, supra note 
22, at 27 (citing MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4). 
 287. Waye, supra note 25, at 255–56 & n.137 (defining the “distinguishing characteristic 
of a fiduciary relationship” as “serv[ing] exclusively the interests of a person or group of 
persons . . . a relationship in which the parties are not each free to pursue their separate 
interests” (quoting Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 CLR 41, 96–97 
(Mason J) (Austl.)). 
 288. Waye, supra note 25, at 255–56 & n.142 (“In a fiduciary relationship the principal is 
entitled to the single-minded loyalty of the fiduciary and the fiduciary must prefer the 
interests of the principal to his or her own interests.”). 
 289. Id. at 256 n.142 (explaining that the fiduciary relationship goes “further than the 
implied duty of good faith, which requires that the contracting parties regard the interests of 
each other as well as their own, in a spirit of co-operation.  Under the duty of good faith the 
contracting parties must refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct”). 
 290. Id. at 256. 
 291. Id. (“The characterization of the relationship between funder and claimholder as 
non-fiduciary does not exclude the imposition of an implied duty of good faith . . . .”). 
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contracts with the claimholder who has equivalent bargaining power.  
Further, lawyers answer to two masters all the time.292
With respect to influence, lawyers have a duty to provide their 
independent judgment, but the law at least in theory (attorney-client 
privilege exceptions and work-product doctrine) embraces the idea that a 
lawyer who provides holistic legal service
 
293 must sometimes seek the 
advice and counsel of others.294  It is not clear how this relationship adds 
any risks over and above those inherent in the relationship between general 
counsel and corporate client,295 contingency fee lawyer and client, or 
insured-insurer.  Further, as pointed out by the Factortame court in 
Australia, issues of confidentiality and independent judgment become less 
problematic when:  (1) the funder contracts directly with the claimant as 
opposed to the lawyer or law firm;296 (2) the contracting parties are of equal 
or similar bargaining power and business savvy as is true in the commercial 
context; and (3) the lawyers are highly skilled and experienced and are 
selected, and are retained by the client.297  Thus, these potential issues 
simply do not justify blanket annulment on public policy grounds.298
There are many arguments against claim funding that are not addressed 
in this section, such as that claim funding turns legal claims into a 
commodity, that claimholders will lose control of their claims, that lawyers 
will become the instrumentality of their clients, or that clients will cede 
total control to funders.  These arguments are left unaddressed for three 
 
 
 292. See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.  Indeed, the ABA revised the 
Canons to permit lawyers to serve as in-house corporate lawyers in 1928.  See Green, supra 
note 17, at 1151 (“[T]he bar associations’ own rules and ethics opinions have eroded the 
assumptions that nonlawyers will derogate the legal profession’s ethics standards and will 
influence lawyers with whom they work to abrogate these standards.”).  This is also true in 
the insured/insurer relationship as discussed. See id. at 1152 (“[L]awyers may be employed 
by insurance companies to represent policyholders.” (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 
N.E.2d 151, 156–59 (Ind. 1999))). 
 293. See Beardslee, supra note 103, at 1876 (“Corporate clients today want and need 
lawyers to provide holistic legal advice, that is, legal advice that takes into account business 
concerns and sometimes, legal advice couched in business terms.”); supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 295. Internal and external professionals are put on teams with internal and external 
lawyers, and they work together to solve legal and business problems. See Rosen, supra note 
139, at 648–49. 
 296. Waye, supra note 25, at 234–35 (explaining that when the funder contracts with the 
claimholder, the funder is not considered a client and therefore conflicts of interest rules do 
not apply; instead, conflicts that arise between the client and funder “are regulated by 
generalized duties of care and loyalty to the client”).  Although there is still a large amount 
of uncertainty, the commercial client has a greater ability to accurately assess the case’s 
value, the potential litigation expenses, and the deal offered by the funder, unlike in the 
context of consumer claim funding or even typical plaintiff contingency fee arrangements. 
Cf. Jay, supra note 257, at 815 (“[T]he great majority of consumers of legal services who 
agree to contingent fee arrangements lack the ability to gauge accurately whether a projected 
recovery will exceed litigation expenses.”). 
 297. See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also Project 28 Pty Ltd v Barr 
[2005] NSWCA 240, ¶ 83 (Palmer J) (Austl.) (emphasizing that the firm retained was 
reputable). 
 298. Waye, supra note 25, at 226. 
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reasons.  First, the force of these concerns varies depending on the type of 
funding (size of claim/recovery and level of control and influence sought by 
the funder) and type of client. 
Second, these issues can arguably be cabined with some degree of 
regulation.  Clearly, some clients will be willing to cede control to funders, 
and there may be some instances where the governing law should protect 
the client from itself and ensure that lawyers do not become the 
instrumentality of the client.  Also, there might be some regulations around 
disclosure of terms and allowable rates of return.  It is not clear, however, 
that a continued insistence that law is not a business but a profession will 
actually prove to make lawyers act as desired professionals.  Only by 
beginning with the premise that law is a business can we improve lawyer 
actions by accepting the business aspects and seeking to improve their 
impact. 
Third, this Article does not aim to determine what type of funding should 
be allowed and what level of influence a funder should be able to wield.  
Instead, it aims to use claim funding as an example to show that:  (1) the 
United States continues to reject outside influence by nonlawyers; 
(2) embracing outside influence may yield benefits otherwise not available; 
(3) doing so may not be as problematic as opponents think (at least in the 
corporate context); and (4) a continued attempt to retain a monopoly on 
legal and related legal services—which necessarily includes a rejection of 
all forms of outside influence—may be more risky than all of the identified 
risks combined.  It is to the last contention that the following section turns. 
C.  Continuing to Prevent Outside Influence by Nonlawyers:  
A Recipe for Failure 
What is true of bacteria is also true in business: 
When the living is good, . . . bacteria have less of a need for high 
mutation rates, because their current strategies are well adapted to their 
environment.  But when the environment grows more hostile, the pressure 
to innovate—to stumble across some new way of eking out a living in a 
resource-poor setting—shifts the balance of risk versus reward involved 
in mutation.299
Arguably, “the living is [no longer] good” in the U.S. legal marketplace, 
which has grown more “hostile” in the past ten years—plagued with 
inefficiencies and failures to innovate and to keep pace with other 
countries.
 
300
 
 299. JOHNSON, supra note 
  Notwithstanding the evolution in alternative fee 
10, at 145–46.  This author is clearly not the first to claim that 
innovation is needed in legal practice and education in order for U.S. lawyers to continue to 
compete with non-U.S. lawyers and with nonlawyers.  Others have even questioned whether 
we are approaching the “end of lawyers.”  See generally THOMAS MORGAN, THE VANISHING 
AMERICAN LAWYER (2010); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?:  RETHINKING THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2008); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 749. 
 300. For example, the legal profession has failed to embrace technology. See generally 
SUSSKIND, supra note 299. 
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arrangements, pressures exist to develop new lawyer-client economic 
paradigms. 
Any innovation or “mutation” holds with it the possibility of risks, but 
given the current environment, it is clear that the potential upside of change 
and mutation is worth the risk.  Claim funding is simply one example of a 
“new way of eking out a living.”  The U.S. bar won’t allow lawyers to loan 
money to clients because of usury laws, so third-party claim funders figured 
out another way to offer it—it is essentially a mutation on the contingency 
fee. 
Currently, lawyers in the United States have a monopoly on taking risks 
in cases and investing in claim assets.301  This is not the case in other parts 
of the modern economy, because many lawyers are not equipped to conduct 
a thorough economic and financial analysis of the prospects of the 
litigation, and they often lack the ability to manage the risk they take on.  In 
the United Kingdom and Australia, outside investment in law firms is 
allowed and happening now.  By incorporating neutral third-party investors, 
who are detached from the legal process, these firms will be better equipped 
to offer more creative and efficient ways to finance and manage cases 
because they foster open environments, diversity, and multidisciplinary 
collaboration.  As Clayton M. Christensen has pointed out about the effect 
of “disruptive innovation” in other contexts, by the time the U.S. 
marketplace realizes the value it should have placed on commercial claim 
funding and embracing nonlawyer outside influence in general, it will only 
be able to, at best, compete with a copy-cat entry behind competitors that 
were first movers in the marketplace.302
Preventing outside claim financiers from investing in and having 
influence on claim management threatens to stymie growth of the U.S. legal 
market.  Embracing such a structure shifts the traditional paradigm from 
one of potential risk to one of potential reward.  As Johnson points out, 
“Innovative environments thrive on useful mistakes, and suffer when the 
demands of quality control overwhelm them.”
 
303
The reality is that, if we do not do it, non-U.S. players will.  There are 
almost 100,000 people employed in the legal services sector in Australia, 
and this sector generated A$18 billion in income during the 2007–08 fiscal 
  The ABA will only be 
able to resist the pressure to allow investment in claims for so long.  
Allowing investment in commercial claims would ensure that U.S. lawyers 
not only remain at the table, but have a say on what is served and how.  The 
bar would not only reap economic benefits by moving early, but would also 
help lead the development of this industry and the regulations that will be 
needed to ensure that the benefits are maximized and the risks curtailed. 
 
 301. See Painter, supra note 255, at 631–32 (contending that permitting nonlawyer 
competition in this area would be “a useful way to combat abuse of market power”). 
 302. Cf. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA xv, xxiii–xxvi (Collins 
Business Essentials 2005) (1997). 
 303. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 148. 
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year, and contributed A$10.9 billion to the country’s economy.304  
Although the United States has the largest market for legal services,305 
there is a huge opportunity for international expansion.  U.S. law firms 
understand this and have been steadily expanding internationally.306
U.S. players are also finding ways to work around the rules.  Burford 
Capital is listed on the London Stock Exchange but clearly offers services 
in the United States.
  It is 
not just American law firms, but also British and Australian firms setting up 
offices in these international markets.  So in some ways, it is a race to be 
first before the markets are satiated. 
307  American law firms are also entering the outside 
investment industry.308
Despite the stringent regulations placed on lawyers, ingenious 
entrepreneurs—most of them non-lawyers—are finding ways to get into 
the legal services business.  Nobody needs to unlock the front door for 
them to enter.  They are climbing through the first floor windows, scaling 
down our chimneys, and seeping through our basement walls.  In ten 
years, much of the deregulation agenda will come to pass without any 
formal deregulation.  U.S. consumers and businesses are already voting 
with their feet.
  As Bill Henderson explained in a recent blog entry: 
309
Opening up the closed U.S. legal marketplace in various ways will ensure 
that these new innovations are monitored and appropriately regulated.
 
310
 
 304. Snapshot of the Legal Profession, LAW COUNCIL AUSTL. (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?file_uuid=A770EF94-
1E4F-17FA-D2D1-BA99625CD699&siteName=lca. 
  
 305. Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition:  Is 
Bigger Really Better?  An International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 769 
(2007). 
 306. Id. at 790 (noting that United States firms’ recognition of international opportunities 
has led to “substantial growth in the number of overseas offices and attorneys of elite law 
firms over the last decade”). 
 307. Press Release, Burford Capital, Burford Reports Continued Activity and Entry into 
UK Market:  Acquisition of Leading UK Litigation Insurance Provider to Form Basis for 
Market Entry (Dec. 12, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/uploadedFiles/
Reuters_Content/2011/12_-_December/chevron--burford.pdf. 
 308. See Vanessa O’Connell, Litigation Funding Market Heats Up, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(Oct. 3, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/03/litigation-funding-market-
heats-up/ (reporting that Simpson Thacher & Bartlett has referred a client to a claim funder 
and that Crowell & Moring has used claim funding). 
 309. William Henderson, Are We Asking the Wrong Questions About Lawyer 
Regulation?, TRUTH ON MARKET (Sept. 19, 2011, 7:58 AM), http://truthonthemarket.com/
2011/09/19/william-henderson-on-are-we-asking-the-wrong-questions-about-lawyer-
regulation/ (providing examples of companies that are innovating and skating close to 
violating many of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that inhibit collaboration 
between lawyers and nonlawyers). 
 310. Many scholars argue that the real solution is optimal regulation. See, e.g, Martin, 
supra note 165, at 114–16 (recommending licensing for funders and compliance with certain 
requirements “to preserve the advantages of litigation financing while eliminating abuses”); 
Steinitz, supra note 225, at 1325–36 (recommending reforming the attorney-client-funder 
relationship, applying consumer protection and contract-design principles, requiring court 
supervision, and tailoring securities regulation for claim-backed securities); Waye, supra 
note 25, at 274 (recommending “that funding agreements in class actions be subject to 
judicial approval but only on limited grounds that might justify their vitiation for matters 
such as unconscionability or misleading and deceptive conduct”). 
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Transdisciplinary legal environments exist in places all over the globe and 
although “thunder’s rolling down the tracks,”311 the sky is not falling.  But 
it might if U.S. lawyers do not (in Bruce Springsteen fashion) “grab [their] 
ticket and [their] suitcase” and get on “this train.”312
CONCLUSION 
 
The U.S. legal profession has created a closed environment that 
quarantines itself from not only the capital marketplace but from the 
professional services marketplace and therefore from potential growth and 
innovation.  The U.S. legal profession’s stance on commercial claim 
funding is merely one example of this attitude.  This Article posits that 
allowing claim funders to fund and exert some influence over the 
management of commercial claims is a positive good, but more than that, it 
argues that success “favors the connected mind.”313  Just as the best Stone 
Soup is created by the accidental combination of ingredients contributed by 
an eclectic group of people, serendipitous innovation is created when 
individuals work in diverse teams and look outside the confines of the 
puzzle for the answer.314 The failure to embrace open environments 
handicaps lawyers from being able to add value and effect change.  
However, just as Stone Soup is not made from stone, serendipitous 
innovations are not serendipitous.  As Johnson points out,  “[t]he challenge” 
is in developing  “environments that foster these serendipitous 
connections.”315
The structure and regulations of the U.S. legal profession reject the story 
of Stone Soup in favor of a fable in which the knight in shining armor 
cunningly slays the dragon and rescues the fair maiden all by himself.  But 
the days of knights are long gone.  Swords and horses have been replaced 
by modern technology, which is continually innovated by multidisciplinary 
teams.  A single knight cannot compete against an army of professionals, 
and the fair maidens in this tale are sophisticated, repeat players capable of 
taking care of themselves in many situations.  If it is true that “we become 
the stories we tell about ourselves,”
  The current legal rules do not create an environment that 
fosters such connections. 
316 it is time for us to take off our armor 
and embrace a new narrative.  We can start by reaching out to nonlawyer 
claim funders and asking them to bring what they’ve got and put it in the 
pot.317
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